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Abstract 
This paper analyses the European Union’s policy of ‘critical dialogue’ with Iran from 
1992 to 1997. Based on a ‘constructivist’ approach it is claimed that the ‘critical dia-
logue’ resulted from the increasing importance of human rights in the Union’s Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy. The ‘critical dialogue’ attempted to change Iranian 
behaviour and strengthen ‘moderate’ forces in Iran by keeping a dialogue on human 
rights, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the Iranian stance on the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, and Iran’s alleged support for terrorism. Although the ‘dialogue’ produced 
little tangible results, structural changes both in Iranian domestic and foreign policy 
give evidence that the ‘dialogue’ has been partly successful. The ‘critical dialogue’ 
was suspended in 1997 after a German court found the Iranian leadership guilty of 
ordering to assassinate four members of the Iranian-Kurdish opposition in Berlin. 
In contrast to the EU the United States pursued a policy of ‘containing’ Iran through 
economic sanctions. The policy differed from the European concept both in means 
and priorities. While the EU’s primary concern was Iran’s internal human rights con-
duct and its regional behaviour, U.S.-policy focused on alleged Iranian support for 
terrorism, its quest for weapons of mass destruction, and its opposition to the Peace 
Process. In 1995 the United States imposed a unilateral trade-embargo against Iran 
and in 1996 sanctions against companies investing in the Iranian oil-sector. 
The election of the ‘moderate’ President Khatami and the following ‘opening’ in 
Iran’s domestic and foreign policies led to a complete reassessment of European and 
American policies. The EU initiated a ‘comprehensive dialogue’ emphasising its 
previous concerns, while the U.S. government seeks a ‘genuine reconciliation’ with 
Iran, mainly to re-vitalise economic relations and to integrate Iran into the security-
structure in the Gulf. Due to the inherent differences in their approaches, however, a 
common Euro-American policy towards Iran seems unlikely. 
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I.  Introduction 
Policy-makers trying to base policies on principles like human rights rather than 
realpolitik suffer from a classical dilemma: Realists claim that in a world of anarchy 
ethical norms have to be subordinated to national security interests, while idealists 
seldom find the measures taken to promote universal justice sufficient.1 After the end 
of the Cold War this dilemma re-emerged with a new emphasis on the promotion of 
democracy and human rights in the world. 
The European Union’s policy of ‘critical dialogue’ was an attempt to integrate human 
rights-concerns into its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 
1992 the Council of Ministers declared that Iran’s massive domestic human rights 
abuses, its continued obstruction of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, its refusal to 
revoke the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and its alleged sponsorship of international 
terrorism, had to be opposed by a policy of constructive but critical engagement: the 
‘critical dialogue’.2 The aim was to make clear that the EU did not tolerate Iranian 
human rights abuses but remained confident that it could strengthen moderate 
factions in Iran and help them to steer the country back into the haven of the interna-
tional community. 
The United States, instead, rejected the European proposals and pursued a policy of 
“active containment” against Iran.3 From 1995 onwards the US government imple-
mented increasingly severe sanctions, aiming to “isolate” Iran until it halted its al-
leged plans to acquire nuclear weapons, its obstruction of the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, and its support for international terrorism.4 The European refusal to support 
the sanctions lead to an ongoing crises in Euro-American relations.5 
When in April 1997 the verdict of a German court declared that the political leader-
ship of Iran had ordered the assassinations of four members of a Kurdish opposition 
group in Berlin in September 19926, the policy of ‘critical dialogue’ was suspended.7 
The ruling seemed finally to prove the U.S. charge that Iran sponsored terrorism and 
                                                 
1 cf. the classical discussion in: Vincent, R. John.: Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge et al., 1986, 
pp.129-150; For the recent debate cf. Halliday, Fred: ‘Morality in International Affairs; A Case for Robust Universalism’. 
Unpublished Paper, London School of Economics and Social Science, 1996. 
2 cf. ‘European Council in Edinburgh, 11.-12.12.1992; Conclusions of the Presidency’, DOC/92/8, §15. 
3 cf. Indyk, Martin: ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’, Keynote Address to the Soref Symposium 
on ‘Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East; Obstacles and Opportunities’, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
18-19.5.1993, p.6; cf. also Indyk’s comments in: ‘Symposium on Dual Containment; U.S. Policy Toward Iran and Iraq’, 
Middle East Policy, 1994, pp.1-26, here p.1-7. 
4 cf. ‘Under Secretary Peter Tarnoff, Testimony before the House International Relations Committee: Containing Iran’, in: 
U.S. Policy Toward Iran; Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 104th Con-
gress, First Session, 9.11.1995. Washington, 1996, pp.45-54. 
5 Rudolf, Peter: Konflikt oder Koordination? Die USA, Iran und die Deutsch-Amerikanischen Beziehungen (Conflict or Co-
ordination? The U.S., Iran, and German-American Relations), Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, 1996, p.18f. 
6 cf. ‘Auszüge aus der mündlichen Urteilsverkündung des Berliner Kammergerichts am 10.4.1997 im sogenannten Myko-
nos-Prozeß’ (Extract from the Oral Pronouncement of the Court of Appeal in Berlin in the so-called ‘Mykonos’-Trial), In-
ternationale Politik, no.5, 1997, pp.128-130. 
7 cf. ‘Declaration by the European Union on Iran’, Luxembourg, 29.4.1997, PESC/97/41. 
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hence justified the approach of rigorous sanctions. The decision was followed by an 
intense discussion on how the American and European approaches could converge. 
But the dramatic changes caused by the unexpected election of Muhammed Khatami 
as President of Iran in May 1997 pointed in a different direction: The ‘moderate’ 
Khatami proposed to open up the Iranian system domestically8, and optimists ex-
pected that relations would soon improve.9 Iran could finally be on the way towards 
those changes that the ‘critical dialogue’ was initially designed to bring about. This 
was dramatically underscored when Khatami declared in an interview on CNN in 
January 1998 that Iran was ready to open a dialogue with the American people.10 The 
American President Bill Clinton answered to Khatami’s proposals in June 1998 
stating that the United States were seeking a “genuine reconciliation” with Iran.11 But 
as long as American sanctions remain, American and European policies will remain 
at odds. 
The European Union reacted on the developments in Iran at the European Council in 
Brussels in March by resuming a “comprehensive dialogue with Iran”.12 Since this 
dialogue proposed to address the same concerns referred to in the ‘critical dialogue’ 
it could be a continuation of the previous policy under a different heading. 
The controversy surrounding the conflicting policies has been highly polemical, and 
the ‘critical dialogue’ has never been thoroughly examined.13 This paper analyses the 
concept of ‘critical dialogue’, evaluates its achievements and failures and asks for the 
prospects of a joint Euro-American policy towards Iran. 
The ‘critical dialogue’ reflects a growing influence of norms on foreign policy-mak-
ing. Human rights norms anchored in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights have become a universal reference for foreign policy decisions.14 
The theoretical problems inherent in this argument have been widely discussed and 
cannot be repeated here.15 What interests us is why the EU integrated human rights in 
                                                 
8 cf. ‘Iran President Opens Term on Conciliatory Note’, Reuters News Service, 3.8.1997. 
9 Interview with Professor Dr. Udo Steinbach, Hamburg, 1.9.1997; Interview with Dr. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Director of 
Postgraduate Studies at the C.M.E.I.S., University of Durham, on BBC 4, 24.8.97, 8.30-9.00 a.m. 
10 cf. ‘Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami’, CNN, 7.1.1998 (internet-document at 
http://cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html). 
11 ‘Remarks by the President on Nomination of Ambassador Bill Richardson as Secretary of Energy, and Richard Holbrooke 
as Ambassador to the United Nations’, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 18.6.1998. 
12 ‘2078th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Brussels’, 30/31 March 1998, PRES/98/86; ‘2104th Council Meeting; General 
Affairs, Luxembourg’, 8/9 June 1998, PRES/98/190. 
13 Exceptions are the critiques of Heinrich, Arthur: ‘Zur Kritik des ‘Kritischen Dialogs; Der Sonderweg Bonn-Teheran’ (On 
the Critique of the ‘Critical Dialogue’; The Special Relationship Bonn-Teheran)’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik, vol.41, no.5, May 1996, pp.532-543; Clawson, Patrick: ‘What to do about Iran’, Middle East Quarterly, December 
1995, pp.39-49; for the only positive treatment cf. Ansari, Ali Massoud: ‘They Shall Still Drink Coke; In Defence of the 
Critical Dialogue’, The World Today, vol.52, no.8-9, August-September 1996, pp.209-211. 
14 cf. Vincent, Human Rights, fn.1, p.130. 
15 cf. John Rawls’ constructivist argument for universal human rights based on an ‘overlapping consensus’ in international 
law: ‘The Law of the Peoples’, in: Shute, Stephen; Hurley, Susan (eds.): On Human Rights; The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
1993. New York, 1993, pp.42-82, esp. p.46. For recent literature Donnelly, Jack: ‘Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of 
International Human Rights’, Ethics and International Affairs, vol.8, 1994, pp.97-117, here pp.110-15. 
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its policy towards Iran, how the policy was implemented, and whether it has been 
successful. 
The main argument of this paper is that the ‘critical dialogue’ reflects the European 
Union’s commitment of the to pursue an active human rights policy as a core element 
of the newly established European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
CFSP was based on three pillars: the promotion of international security, 
international (economic) cooperation, and democracy/human rights. Since Iran’s 
international behaviour made a cooperation in security and economic matters difficult 
to justify, the EU concentrated on the promotion of human rights and pressure on 
Iran’s foreign policy while economic ties continued mainly on a bilateral, yet reduced 
level. 
The paper is structured in five parts. Based on a ‘constructivist’ approach to interna-
tional politics the first section will discuss the influence of norms on foreign policy-
making.16 The heart of the paper is dedicated to an analysis and evaluation of the 
‘critical dialogue’. This will be followed by a discussion of the major critics of the 
dialogue in the United States and Europe. Based on the empirical material, the fifth 
part returns to the theoretical argument and asks whether the ‘critical dialogue’ lived 
up to its normative basis. The concluding section then tackles the difficult question 
of future European and American policies towards Iran, taking into account the 
dramatic changes since the election of President Muhammed Khatami. 
II.  Theoretical Framework 
All major theories of international relations are based on normative assumptions.17 
The traditional realist perception that human nature is inherently bad and thus inter-
state conflict is inevitable has been the dominant ‘norm’ in this field of study since 
World War II. It became the antithesis to the liberal perception that men act accord-
ing to reason and that progress towards peace may be achieved through education, 
free trade, and the institutionalization of international affairs. 
These normative assumptions have major implications on how policy makers per-
ceive problems and how foreign policy is conducted. It makes an essential difference 
whether we perceive as the priority of policy towards Iran to maintain a ‘balance of 
power’ in the Gulf region, to conduct free trade-relations, or whether we perceive the 
human rights situation in Iran as the crucial determinant of foreign policy. 
                                                 
16 The core texts used here are: Wendt, Alexander: ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of Power 
Politics’, International Organization, vol.46, no.2, Spring 1992, pp.391-425, here p.393f.; Koslowski, Rey; Kratochwil, 
Friedrich V.: ‘Understanding Change in International Politics; the Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System’, 
International Organization, vol.48, no.2, Spring 1994, pp.215-47, here p. 222-227. 
17 cf. Brown, Chris: International Relations Theory; New Normative Approaches, Hampstead, 1992, p.3; Smith, Steve: ‘The 
Self-Images of a Discipline; A Genealogy of International Relations Theory’, in: Booth, Ken; Smith, Steve (eds.): In-
ternational Relations Theory Today, Cambridge, 1995, pp.1-37, here p.30; Waltz also asserts that all theories are based on 
“theoretical assumptions”: Waltz, Kenneth: Theory of International Politics. New York et al., 1979, p.117f. 
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The dominant theories of international politics, neorealism and neoliberalism, have 
neglected the importance of norms and their crucial impact on foreign policy.18 
Hence they offer little help to understand how human rights norms influenced the 
reorientation of the EU’s foreign policy and the adoption of the ‘critical dialogue’. 
Neorealist and Neoliberal Approaches to Foreign Policy 
The ‘systemic’ theory of neorealism developed by Kenneth Waltz claims to provide a 
scientific approach to explain the behaviour of states in the international system.19 
This system is perceived to constitute a realm of policies among states that is distinct 
from the input of individual agents. The absence of any binding rules governing rela-
tions among states determines the anarchic structure of the system and this is not 
likely to change. States are regarded as the prime actors, perceived to be functionally 
alike and driven by their will to survival. The systemic position of a state is deter-
mined by its capabilities, mainly in military and economic terms. The distribution of 
these capabilities is the core variable determining stability and change in the interna-
tional system: the distribution of power.20 
Three core normative assumptions underlie this theory: that international relations 
can be scientifically explained, that states are alike and their internal structure is of 
no significance, and that the distribution of power is the only variable accounting for 
change. In this framework, the region of the Gulf is subject to analysis only in terms 
of the military and economic capabilities of the major states and the likelihood of 
conflict if the regional balance of power is changed. A military superiority of Iran ac-
quired by a nuclear capability could create a danger of conflict that would determine 
a policy to prevent Iran from acquiring such weapons. This perception dominates, as 
we will later see, the current American policy in the Gulf. 
The neorealist ‘counter theory’, neoliberalism, shares many of these assumptions, yet 
its conclusions are very different. Its major thesis is that the anarchy of the interna-
tional system can be overcome by institutionalisation, i.e. the likelihood of conflict 
can be reduced through cooperation.21 States are perceived as the prime actors, con-
ducting affairs by pursuing identifiable interests whose priority depends on the pos-
sibility of conflict. In areas of high interdependence and good relations, economic 
interests are the core determinant of policy, and cooperation and trade can in turn re-
duce tensions and minimise the likelihood of conflict.22 
                                                 
18 cf. Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, pp.217-219. 
19 Waltz, Theory, fn.17, pp.38-59. 
20 Waltz, Theory, fn.17, pp.102-123. 
21 Keohane, Robert O.: ‘International Liberalism Reconsidered’, in: Dunn, John (ed.): The Economic Limits to Modern 
Politics. Cambridge et al., 1990, pp.165-194, here esp. p.182f. 
22 Keohane, ‘Liberalism’, fn.21, p.177f. 
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Hence European policy to keep links with Iran could be explained as pursuing Eu-
rope’s economic interests and as a means to make Iran change domestic policies ham-
pering its stance in the international community. This was reflected in the general 
perception of the ‘critical dialogue’ as a fig-leaf to pursue economic interests in Iran. 
Both theories are in general very similar, even though they come from very different 
angles of the scientific debate. Both paradigms see states as the core agents in the in-
ternational system, these states pursue identifiable, rational interests, and with the 
possible use of military means there remains an ever present danger of conflict, in the 
neoliberal case however tamed by cooperation and institutionalisation.23 
But these concepts cannot explain why human rights have become a core determinant 
of foreign policy making. Their importance lies in the fact that they have had a great 
influence on the conceptualisation of policy both in the U.S. and in Europe.24 The fol-
lowing constructivist approach integrates arguments of the traditional paradigms in a 
theory that takes the norms underlying the international system critically into 
account. 
Norms in Foreign Policy: The ‘Constructivist’ Argument 
The core argument of constructivist theory25 is that norms shape the foreign policy of 
states.26 Norms are developed in the interaction of different groups in domestic as 
well as in international society, and their increasing acceptance leads to change in the 
rules of international behaviour.27 Hence the growing body of norms for the protec-
tion and promotion of human rights especially in the United Nations has caused a 
strong imperative for policy-makers to take human rights into account.28 
Constructivism makes three crucial theoretical assumptions that will help us here to 
understand why the European Union developed its human rights policy: 
First, change in international society is not caused by the structure of the interna-
tional system, but by the changing perception of norms underlying international rela-
tions. These norms develop in the interplay of societal groups and the political 
sphere. The set of rules and norms underlying a society determine the identity of a 
                                                 
23 cf. Baldwin, David: ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics’, in: Baldwin, David (ed.): Neorealism and Neo-
liberalism; The Contemporary Debate. New York, 1993, pp.3-25, here pp.4-8. 
24 cf. Hoffmann, Stanley: Janus and Minerva; Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics. Boulder (CO), 
London, 1987, pp.10-11. 
25 ‘Constructivism’ is still not developed as a cohesive theory. Some like Smith present it as ‘constitutive’ theory. Cf. Smith, 
‘The Self-Images’, fn.17, p.26-28; Risse-Kappen, Thomas: ‘Democratic Peace - Warlike Democracies? A Social 
Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument’, European Journal of International Relations, vol.1, no.4, pp.491-517, 
here p.502; See also the references in fn.16. 
26 cf. Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, p.216, 223. 
27 A powerful example provides Robert Jackson’s analysis of the norm of self-determination leading to the unacceptability 
and later the end of colonialism after World War II: Quasi States; Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World. 
Cambridge, 1990, p.83, 85, passim. 
28 Vincent, Human Rights, fn.1, p.130. 
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state or a certain political group and from that its international behaviour.29 The in-
terests of agents can thereby be altered and reformulated due to changing societal 
demands and priorities.30 Hence the interest to protect what is perceived as national 
security or to promote perceived economic interests can vary tremendously, and it 
lies in the choice of the dominant agents in the foreign policy process to define these 
interests and their importance on the ground of societal norms. 
Second, the focus on the intersocietal shaping of norms makes it inevitable to include 
the importance of individual actors in the analysis of policy-making. The choices of 
these political actors, shaped by their perceptions of international society, and re-
flected in their state’s identity, determine the overall policy of a state.31 Most impor-
tantly: the change of political leadership can account for major shifts in both domes-
tic and foreign policy, as the example of Michael Gorbachev demonstrated32. 
Third, the prevalence of certain norms does not determine the outcome of policies, it 
can rather help us to understand how the perceptions of policy choices developed and 
why certain choices were preferred.33 Thus constructivism is not a scientific approach 
to a perceived international system offering explanations about how states behave. It 
is rather stressing the importance of choices made by political agents giving us only 
permissive hints to understand international developments.34 
The question is now, what constructivism offers to a better understanding of human 
rights in the EU’s foreign policy in general, and the ‘critical dialogue’ in particular. 
First, if norms are the core influence in shaping foreign policies, it becomes obvious 
why the EU integrated human rights into their recently developed Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
and the United Nations’ Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, have become the universal basis of judgement about the 
behaviour of states in international bodies.35 With the end of the Cold War it became 
apparent that the West had supported autocratic regimes to oppose communism. This 
policy became unsustainable amongst the continued charges of ‘double standards’ 
against Western governments by human rights groups and the domestic opposition.36 
                                                 
29 cf. Jepperson, Ronald L.; Wendt, Alexander; Katzenstein, Peter J.: ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security’, in: 
Katzenstein, Peter J. (ed.): The Culture of National Security; Norms and Identity in World Politics. New York, Chichester, 
1996, pp.33-75, here p.58; Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, p.216. 
30 cf. Weldes, Jutta: ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, vol.2, no.3, pp.275-318, 
here p.279f. 
31 cf. Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, p.216; Risse-Kappen, ‘Democratic Peace’, fn.25, p.502. 
32 This is the example discussed in Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, p.228-247. 
33 For the debate about ‘explaining’ and ‘understanding’ cf. Hollis, Martin; Smith, Steve: Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations, Oxford, 1990, esp. pp.1-15. 
34 cf. Koslowski; Kratochwil, ‘Understanding Change’, fn.16, p.216. 
35 cf. Donnelly, Jack: The Concept of Human Rights. London, New York, 1985, pp.1f.; pp.27ff. 
36 on the integration of human rights in Western policy-making cf. Sikkink, Kathryn: ‘The Power of Principled Ideas: Hu-
man Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe’, in: Goldstein, Judith; Keohane, Robert O. (eds.): Ideas and 
Foreign Policy; Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. Ithaca, London, 1993, pp.139-170, here pp.154ff., 160-166. 
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Second, stressing that change in the international society is determined by intersocie-
tal developments means that we have to look at both the domestic and the interna-
tional level to understand aims and ideas in foreign policy. This is especially impor-
tant in the case of the EU as an intergovernmental institution, where foreign policy is 
shaped both on the domestic level of member-states, in the intergovernmental 
cooperation in European institutions, and by developments in the international realm. 
Especially the European Parliament played an important role in pressuring the EU’s 
Council of Ministers to integrate human rights into the development of the CFSP. 
Hence although the ‘critical dialogue’ was developed as a policy of shared concern in 
the Council of Ministers, we have to take a look at the discussions on the member-
states level. 
Third, the ‘critical dialogue’ represented an approach to diplomacy that does not 
make sense if only structures matter. The aim of the dialogue was to strengthen al-
legedly moderate politicians in Iran, thereby preventing a radicalization of the regime 
that was feared if Iran were isolated from the international community. Hence the EU 
took account of the internal situation in Iran instead of judging Iran only on the 
grounds of its alleged power-capabilities constituting a “threat” to the international 
system.37 
Keeping these theoretical assumptions in mind, we will now examine the basis on 
which the ‘critical dialogue’ was formulated: the European human rights policy. 
III.  Human Rights in European Foreign Policy 
The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), formerly Euro-
pean Political Cooperation (EPC), has become the framework for European foreign 
policy. The CFSP is still weak and serves only as an umbrella for the largely in-
dependent foreign policy of the member-states. Yet since the Maastricht Treaty has 
defined its concrete aims, joint initiatives have increased, and the CFSP has become 
the second pillar of the EU’s institutional framework.38 As defined in the Maastricht 
Treaty (Article J) its core aims are: “to preserve peace and strengthen international 
security”, “to promote international cooperation”, and “to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms”.39 
                                                 
37 cf. Indyk, ‘Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’ fn.3, p.3, p.6. 
38 Regelsberger, Elfriede: ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’, in: Weidenfeld, Werner; Wessels, Wolfgang: Europe 
from A to Z; Guide to European Integration. Luxembourg, 1997, pp.41-46, here p.41; For a general overview of the devel-
oping CFSP cf. respective articles by Elfriede Regelsberger: ‘Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik’ (Common Foreign 
and Security Policy), in: Weidenfeld, Werner; Wessels, Wolfgang (eds.): Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration (Yearbook 
of European Integration), 1992/93ff. 
39 ‘Memorandum to the Plenary Session of the 49th UN General Assembly’, 27.9.1994, in: European Foreign Policy Bul-
letin, Doc. 94/228, 1994, vol.10, pp.312-322, here p.312. 
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Since the EU’s role in the preservation of peace and security is still little developed 
and remains largely on a diplomatic bases, the promotion of international economic 
cooperation has become the major factor of European foreign policy. As far as the 
Middle East is concerned, the EU engages in the economic development in most 
countries and pursues to negotiate a free-trade-area in the Mediterranean40 and a 
trade-agreement with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).41 
While the promotion of democracy and human rights had mainly a diplomatic charac-
ter in the former EPC, its role has increased steadily. The growing importance given 
to human rights must be seen in the light of the pressure from the European Parlia-
ment and human rights groups to take the dimension of human rights seriously and 
integrate those concerns in the CFSP. 
The Integration of Human Rights since the 1980s 
The EU’s activity on human rights in its external relations has been limited, a coordi-
nated human rights policy has only been apparent since the early 1990s.42 Yet since 
the introduction of the Single European Act (SEA), several documents defined the 
gradual incorporation of human rights into the EPC and later the CFSP. 
In their first major ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ of 1986, the Foreign Ministers 
outlined the principles of human rights in the Community’s external relations: 
“respect for human rights is one of the cornerstones of European cooperation. (..) The pro-
tection of human rights is the legitimate and continuous duty of the world community and of 
nations individually. Expressions of concern at violations of such rights cannot be considered 
interference in the domestic affairs of a state.”43 
Furthermore it was emphasised that human rights were “an important element in rela-
tions between third countries and the Europe of twelve” and that the Union would 
“continue to promote fundamental rights”. 
With the ‘Declaration on Human Rights’ in 1991 the EC acknowledged that 
“tensions and conflicts arising from flagrant and systematic violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in one country (..) are often a threat to international peace and secu-
rity.”44 
The Community declared to include “clauses on human rights in economic and coop-
eration agreements with third countries” to actively promote human rights.45 The core 
                                                 
40 cf. Jünemann, Annette: ‘Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union; Demokratisierungsprogramme zwischen nor-
mativer Zielsetzung und realpolitischen Pragmatismus’ (The Mediterranean Policy of the EU), in: Frankreich-Jahrbuch 
1997, ed. by the Deutsch-Französisches Institut et al., Opladen, 1997, pp.93-115. 
41 For European Middle East Policy cf. Hubel, Helmut: ‘Die Nahost- und Mittelmeerpolitik’ (Middle East and Mediterra-
nean Policy), in: Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1994/95, pp.247-252; Behrendt, Sven: ‘Die Nahost- und Mittel-
meerpolitik’ (Middle East and Mediterranean Policy), in: Ibid., 1995/96, pp.247-252, 1996/97, pp.253-258. 
42 cf. Human Rights and the European Union, Internet-document at: helsinki.fi/valttdk/neusem/siponen/; ‘The European 
Union and Human Rights in the World’, Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 3/95, Luxembourg, 1996. 
43 ‘Declaration on Human Rights’, 21.7.1986, European Political Cooperation Bulletin (EPC-Bulletin), 1986, pp.57-58. 
44 ‘Declaration Concerning Human Rights’, 28/29 June 1991, in: EPC-Bulletin, Doc. 91/194, 1991, vol.7, Luxembourg, 
1993, pp.322-324, here p.323. 
45 ibid., p.324. 
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way to implement these aims was finally defined in the ‘Resolution on Human 
Rights, Democracy and Development’ of November 1991: 
“The Community and its Member States will explicitly introduce the consideration of human 
rights as an element of their relations with developing countries; human rights clauses will be 
inserted in future co-operation agreements.”46 
The declaration stressed in particular that the Community would “give high priority 
to a positive approach” by keeping an “open and constructive dialogue” to promote 
human rights.47 Accordingly, the EU pursues a ‘cooperative’ approach and objects 
economic sanctions as a measure to enforce human rights improvements. 
With the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993 the CFSP became 
the institutional and legal framework for the EU’s external relations, explicitly stat-
ing the aim to promote “respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”48  
In summary, four core objectives of a European human rights policy emerged: First, 
promoting human rights constitutes an imperative grounded in the character of Euro-
pean cooperation itself; second, the EU considers respect for human rights as an ele-
ment for any institutionalized political and economic cooperation with third coun-
tries; third, institutionalized economic cooperation and development-aid are subject 
to human rights conditionality; and finally, the promotion of human rights serves 
both international security and the improvement of economic cooperation. 
Hence the EU is committed to promote human rights in its foreign policy, and the Eu-
ropean Parliament can demand human rights measures on the grounds of the Treaty. 
The Barcelona Declaration, for example, that outlined the EU-cooperation in the Me-
diterranean demonstrates this importance given to human rights.49 And the recent EU 
agreement on Arms Exports made the human rights situation in the recipient country 
a core criterion for the export of conventional arms.50 The ‘critical dialogue’ is 
inseparably linked to this development of a human rights grounded European foreign 
policy. 
Human Rights in European Foreign Policy Institutions 
The major institutions concerned with human rights within the EU framework are the 
Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament.51 
                                                 
46 ‘Resolution of the Council and of the Member States Meeting in the Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Devel-
opment’ (RHRDD), European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Subcommittee on Human Rights, PE 
156.345, 26.2.1992, p.7. 
47 RHRDD, fn.46, p.3. 
48 Article J.1, Maastricht Treaty, quoted in: ‘Memorandum’, fn.39, p.312. 
49 cf. Text of Barcelona Declaration; Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona (27.-28.11.1995), EU Doc/95/7, 4.12.1995: 
The ‘preamble’ dedicates 7 of its 14 paragraphs to respect for human rights. 
50 ‘EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports’, ‘2097th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Brussels, 25.5.1998, PRES/98/162. 
51 ‘Human Rights and the European Union’, fn.42, p.8f. The Council of Europe is the most important human rights insti-
tution for EU member-states and the signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights, involving judicial power over 
all signatory states. Hence the EU’s policies discussed here could be interpreted as the external component of the European 
human rights regime applying to states outside the realm of the Council. 
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The strongest promoter for human rights in the Union’s external relations is the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP). Its reports, resolutions, and the activities of the parliamentary 
committees had a strong focus on human rights ever since the Parliament was firstly 
elected in 1979. The EP can ask written questions on the conduct of the European 
Commission and is the major watchdog of the Union’s policies. While its powers 
were traditionally weak, human rights have become one of the core issues by which 
the EP can exert pressure on both the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 
Since the European Single Act came into force in 1992, the EP can refuse the 
approval of EU-agreements with non-member states on the grounds of human rights 
concerns. Turkey, Syria, Morocco and Israel have already been affected by these 
restrictions.52 The EP played a crucial role in shaping European public opinion on 
relations with Iran by consistently questioning the Commission’s policies and tabling 
critical resolutions. 
The European Commission is less active on human rights issues. It is responsible for 
EU-relations with the UN and other international bodies concerned with human 
rights, and it is entitled to start its own, country-related initiatives. The Commission 
represents the EU at the UN Commission on Human Rights and has regularly spon-
sored resolutions condemning Iran’s human rights abuses. 
The Council of Ministers, composed by the representatives of the member state’s 
governments, is the core institution shaping the EU’s international relations. It has 
demonstrated increasing activity on human rights. The Council both initiated the 
‘critical dialogue’, and, represented by the EU-Troika53, led regular negotiations with 
Iran on human rights issues. Yet the Council has to weigh human rights concerns 
against the other aims of the CFSP, international security and economic cooperation. 
Hence human rights policies formulated in the CFSP sometimes have to give way to 
overriding security concerns that can make these policies appear inconsistent. 
Promotion of Human Rights as Expression of European Identity 
The integration of human rights into the CFSP and its institutions provides the 
normative framework to understand European human rights policy. In view of the 
increasing importance of human rights in European foreign policy, the promotion of 
human rights has become a core aspect of European identity.54 The CFSP-measures 
must be interpreted in the light of these developments. In this context the formulation 
                                                 
52 cf. Hollis, Rosemary: ‘Europe and the Middle East; Power by Stealth?’ International Affairs, vol.73, no.1, 1997, pp.15-29, 
here p.19ff; Islam, Shada: ‘No to Marocco and Syria’, Middle East International, 24.1.1992, p.13. 
53 The Troika is composed of the President of the Council of Ministers and the preceding and succeeding Presidents. 
54 cf. Duparc, Christiane: The European Community and Human Rights, Commission of the European Communities, Lux-
embourg, 1992, p.25: “(..) the principles of representative democracy and respect for human rights have rapidly become one 
of the central strands of both European integration and the affirmation of Europe’s identity throughout the world.” Cf. also 
Wessels, Wolfgang: ‘Europäische Identität aus politischer Sicht; Modeerscheinung, Mythos oder magische Legitimations-
formel?’ (European Identity from a Political Perspective), in: Auf der Suche nach Europäischer Identität, ed. by Wilhelm 
Hinrichsmeyer et al., Bonn, 1995, pp.101-122, here p.107f. 
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of the ‘critical dialogue’ can be understood as the institutionalization of the human 
rights-component in the EU’s policy towards Iran, reflecting a ‘positive approach’ of 
promoting human rights through dialogue. 
But this approach is still a weak one, since its adoption depends on the consensus of 
all EU Member-States.55 While the EU found a common policy towards Iran, it lacks 
e.g. a consistent policy on China56 or on Saudi Arabia. Hence the EU remains open to 
charges of inconsistency and double standards. It will need a long time to agree on 
more than such a minimal-consensus policy. Yet one has to bear in mind that a weak 
but consistent multilateral policy is still preferable to the lack of any such policy. 
It must be stressed too, that the member-states’ bilateral relations with Iran still play 
a significant role in determining the overall European policy. Yet the ‘critical dialo-
gue’ was a common European human rights strategy towards Iran. 
IV. The ‘Critical Dialogue’ with the Islamic Republic of 
Iran 
The adoption of the ‘critical dialogue’ reflected two antagonistic trends: The emer-
gence of the CFSP with its emphasis on human rights and the “hope” expressed by 
the Council of Ministers that Iran was about to normalize its relations with the West 
after the allegedly ‘pragmatic’ President Hashemi Rafsanjani57 took office in 1989.58 
While the European Parliament strengthened its continuous criticism of Iran’s human 
rights abuses the EU aimed at closer economic and political cooperation with Iran. 
These developments increasingly conflicted with each other and made a new strategy 
necessary: the ‘critical dialogue’. It aimed at improving Iranian behaviour and in the 
long term re-integrating the country both regionally and internationally. The basis of 
this policy was the recognition that an important country like Iran could not and 
should not be ‘isolated’ in the region, yet it had to adhere to internationally accepted 
norms of behaviour before it could be accepted as a political and economic partner.59 
                                                 
55 Although CFSP action can be taken by majority-decisions (MD), there has been no practical use of MD so far. Cf. Re-
gelsberger, ‘GASP 1994/95’, fn.38, p.219. The Amsterdam summit enhanced the basis for MDs, yet practical use has still to 
come. Cf. Regelsberger, ‘GASP 1996/97’, fn.38, p.222. 
56 In 1997 France, followed by Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain did not support a joint EU-resolution condemning human 
rights abuses in China at the UNCHR. A motion presented by Denmark was squashed. Cf. ‘EU/Konklave: Van Mierlo Stig-
matisiert Frankreichs Haltung zur Menschenrechtsfrage in China (Van Mierlo Criticised France’s Stance on Human Rights 
in China)’, Agence Europe, 7./8.4.1997, p.8. In 1998 the Council “expressed a strong interest in pursuing an intensified 
dialogue with China on human rights questions and in developing a common approach within the EU on this aspect of the 
relationship.” Hence, there is still no common approach. ‘2066th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Brussels’, 26.1.1998. 
57 Cf. Steinbach, Udo: Ali Akbar Haschemi Rafsandschani, Kurzbiographie (Brief Biography), Orient, vol.38, no.2, 1997, 
pp.221-223, here p.211, 220ff. 
58 For a general chronology of events, cf. the yearly articles by Rieck, Andreas: ‘Iran’, in: Nahost-Jahrbuch; Politik, Wirt-
schaft und Gesellschaft in Nordafrika und dem Nahen und Mittleren Osten (Yearbook Near and Middle East; Politics, 
Economics and Society in Northern Africa and the Middle East), volumes 1987-1997, ed. by Deutsches Orient Institut; 
Thomas Koszinowski; Hanspeter Mattes, Opladen, 1988-1998. (quoted as: Nahost-Jahrbuch) 
59 cf. ‘Iran-Politik der Bundesregierung; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage’ (Iran-Policy of the Federal 
Government; Answer of the Federal Government to the ‘Major Parliamentary Question’). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 
13/3483, 16.01.1996, p.2. 
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The Historical Context 
It is usually claimed that the ‘critical dialogue’ grew out of a special German-Iranian 
relationship and out of German interest in improving economic relations with Iran60. 
The argument derives from the insistence of the German government to keep up a po-
litical dialogue with the Iranian regime after the Iranian Revolution.61 Foreign Secre-
tary Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the first Western official to visit Tehran after the 
Revolution in 1984, and he was also the first Western official publicly blaming Iraq 
for attacking Iran in 1987, a major step in promoting Iran’s acceptance of UN-reso-
lution 598 that brought an end to the Gulf-War. Iran’s acceptance was interpreted as 
a major success inter alia of German diplomatic efforts.62 In March 1988 an 
unprecedented joint German-Iranian colloquium took place in Hamburg to discuss 
mutual problems, a first step to enhance cultural and academic contacts later contin-
ued in the Human Rights-Seminars in Hamburg and Tehran discussed below.63 Gen-
scher visited Iran again in November 1988 and a German-Iranian cultural agreement 
was signed. But the agreement was declared invalid as a consequence of the fatwa 
against Salman Rushdie that provoked an unexpectedly harsh German critique.64 
Although German-Iranian relations anticipated some aspects of the ‘critical dia-
logue’, German foreign policy was increasingly embedded into the EPC and later the 
CFSP. Thus, the ‘dialogue’ was transformed into a joint European policy. 
The European adoption of the ‘critical dialogue’ corresponded with the newly emer-
ging human rights policy discussed above, and the European interest to integrate Iran 
politically and economically in the region. 
Three regional developments account for the new ‘positive’ approach towards Iran. 
First, Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1988 and Rafsanjani’s accession as President of 
the Islamic Republic was perceived to end the revolutionary period in Iran. 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami coined the term “Second Republic” arguing that Iran had 
become “an ordinary state” of the international community.65 This perception was 
underscored by the Iranian tolerance of the military operation against Iraq’s 
occupation of Kuwait, interpreted as a major step towards a ‘pragmatic’ Iranian 
                                                 
60  Behrendt, ‘Nahost- und Mittelmeerpolitik’, fn.41, p.257; Heinrich, ‘Kritik des ‘Kritischen Dialogs’’, fn.13, p.541. 
61 cf. Steinbach, Udo: ‘Ist der Iran das Reich des Bösen? Die Vereinigten Staaten und Europa streiten über die Politik 
gegenüber Teheran’ (Iran, the Empire of Evil? The U.S. and Europe Argue over their Policies Towards Tehran), Der 
Überblick, no.2, 1996, pp.30-32; and ‘Iran-Politik der Bundesregierung’, fn.59, p.6. 
62 cf. Steinbach, Udo: ‘Iran 1987’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1987, fn.58, pp.79-88, here p.84f.; Steinbach, Udo; Alkazaz, Aziz: ‘Die 
Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Nahost 1988’ (German Relations with the Middle East), Nahost-Jahrbuch 
1988, fn.58, pp.13-18, here p.16. 
63 documented in Persian and German as: Deutsch-Iranisches Kolloquium; Religion und Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Politik, 
bilaterale Beziehungen (German-Iranian Colloquium; Religion and Society, Economy and Politics, Bilateral Relations), 
summarized by Peter Heine, Hamburg, 28.-30 March 1988, Hamburg, 1989. 
64 cf. Steinbach, Udo; Alkazaz, Aziz: ‘Die Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Nahost 1989’ (German Relations 
with the Middle East), Nahost-Jahrbuch 1989, fn.58, pp.13-18, here p.16: The German Parliament condemned the fatwa as a 
declaration of war against the Western system of law and norms and against international law. 
65 Ehteshami, Anoushiravan: After Khomeini; The Iranian Second Republic. London, New York, 1995, pp.xivf. 
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foreign policy.66 During the conflict the European Union lifted its economic sanctions 
against Iran in October 1990 and declared the “normalization” of relations with the 
Islamic Republic.67 
Second, Iran had helped to release Western hostages in Lebanon, who’s allegedly 
Iran-supported caption had been a core obstacle to better relations. The last hostages 
were freed in December 1991 removing this major impediment to rapprochement.68 
Third, the UN Special Representative on Human Rights (UNSR) was allowed to visit 
Iran for the first time. The Council interpreted this as an Iranian step towards greater 
respect of the international human rights norms enshrined in the UN Charter.69 
These developments led to an overall ‘positive’ Western attitude towards Iran, ex-
pressed in its most optimistic form in a report to the European Commission on Euro-
pean relations with the Middle East.70 Its main proposals in respect to Iran were: po-
litical and economic integration of Iran into the international community to “assist its 
economic reconstruction” and “strengthen the hand of the pragmatic wing of the re-
gime”; to “negotiate a free trade agreement between the EC and Iran”; and to “advo-
cate (..) the liberalization of trade between the GCC and Iran”.71 Respect for human 
rights was also promoted in the report, yet focused mainly on Iraq.72 Accordingly, the 
European Commission had several negotiations in 1992 to prepare a trade-agreement 
with Iran. These negotiations ended, however, mainly due to differences on a 
“proposal for an agreement on human rights.”73 
On the other hand the European Union supported efforts after Gulf War II to create a 
system of regional security in the Gulf that included Iran74, mainly to secure the oil-
supply for Western Europe.75 But the negotiations for such an agreement failed with 
                                                 
66 Hashim, Ahmed: The Crisis of the Iranian State; Domestic, Foreign and Security Policies in Post-Khomeini Iran. 
ADELPHI Paper 296. London, 1995, p.36ff.; Ehteshami, After Khomeini, fn.65, p.152f. 
67 cf. Hashim, Crisis, fn.66, p.37; ‘Joint Communiqué of the European Community, its Member States and the Cooperation 
Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and its Member States’, EPC Press Release, New York, 27.9.1990, P73/90, 
§3; Answer to Questions No H-1228/90, No H-1229/90, No H-1240/90 and No H 1257/90 concerning Iran and Human 
Rights, 12.12.1990, EPC-Bulletin, Doc. 90/457, pp.506-507, here p.507. 
68 Ehteshami, After Khomeini, fn.65, p.163. 
69 ‘Statement at the 49th Session of the Commission on Human Rights’, 1.3.1993, EPC-Bulletin, Doc.93/079, p.147. 
70 Nonneman, Gerd (ed.): The Middle East and Europe; The Search for Stability and Integration. London, 21993. 
71 ‘Conclusions and Policy Recommendations’, in: Nonneman, Middle East, fn.70, pp.259-276, here p.266. 
72 cf. Mallat, Chibli: ‘Human Rights in the Middle East’, in: Nonneman, Middle East, fn.70, pp.245-249. 
73 Agence Europe reported that the Council of Ministers had renounced a discussion on future relations with Iran without 
giving reasons. Agence Europe, no.5748, 12.6.1992, p.7 (Translation M.S.); cf. also Kommission der Europäischen Ge-
meinschaften (ed.): 26. Gesamtbericht über die Tätigkeit der EG 1992 (Report on the Activity of the EC), Luxembourg, 1993, 
p.300, §858, stating that the Commission held talks on a potential cooperation agreement. 
74 On the EU’s promotion of regional security cooperation in the Gulf, cf. Hollis, Rosemary: ‘Europe and Gulf Security; A 
Competitive Business’, paper presented at the ECSSR Conference, Gulf Security in the 21st Century, 6.-8.1.1996, p.3f.; 
Steinbach, Udo: ‘Ein neues Sicherheitssystem für den Golf’ (A New Security System for the Gulf), Internationale Politik, 
vol.50, no.3, March 1995, pp.33-40. On the dim prospects for security co-operation in the Gulf cf. Chubin, Sharam: ‘Iran and 
Regional Security in the Persian Gulf’, Survival, vol.34, no.3, Autumn 1992, pp.62-80. 
75 cf. ‘Improving Relations Between the European Union and the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)’, 
Commission of the European Communities, COM/95/541, Brussels, 22.11.1995, p.2. 
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the United States becoming a hegemonial power providing for Gulf security through 
bilateral agreements with GCC-states.76 
Despite the overall optimism, however, Iranian policies were still not as ‘pragmatic’ 
as perceived. Iranian domestic and foreign policies were determined by an internal 
power-struggle between ‘radicals’ and ‘pragmatists’77, and the radical factions 
consistently thwarted moves towards normalization with the West.78 
Among the developments leading to the ‘critical dialogue’, six are of special impor-
tance. First and foremost, Iran’s domestic human rights abuses did continue since 
Rafsanjani was unable to control the radicals. Especially the re-emergence of bash-
squads against ‘insufficiently’ veiled women and the persecution of the Baha’i mi-
nority were severely criticised in Europe.79 
Second, despite some weak declarations, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie was reaf-
firmed and Rafsanjani seemed unable to counter the Bonyad-e Panzdeh Khordad, a 
private organization promising a bounty of $1 million for Rushdie’s murder.80 The 
British Foreign Office in particular refused to normalize ties with Iran under these 
circumstances.81 And the German Parliament passed a motion calling on the govern-
ment to hold the Iranian leadership directly responsible for any harm inflicted on 
Rushdie.82 
Third, both in Germany and France assassinations of Iranian dissidents were blamed 
on the Iranian secret service, and domestic pressure in both countries intensified to 
investigate these claims. In September 1992 the murder of three Iranian-Kurdish op-
position leaders, among them the head of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran Sadiq 
Sharafkandi, and an interpreter in the Mykonos Restaurant in Berlin was quickly 
linked to Iran.83 Evidence for this link led to the suspension of the dialogue in 1997. 
                                                 
76 cf. Steinbach, ‘Sicherheitssystem für den Golf’, fn.74, p.33f. 
77 For a discussion of the ‘pragmatic’/‘radical’ divide cf. Ramazani, R. K.: Iran’s Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations, 
in: Middle East Journal, vol.43, no.2, Spring 1989, pp.202-217, here pp.210-214; Cf. also the quarterly Iran-Report of the 
Economist Intelligence Unit focusing consistently on the internal power struggle in Iran. 
78 For a more detailed discussion cf. Halliday, Fred: ‘An Elusive Normalization; Western Europe and the Iranian Revolu-
tion’, Middle East Journal, vol.48, no.2, Spring 1994, pp.309-326. 
79 cf. ‘One too many; Iran in a mess’, The Economist, vol.327, 1.5.1993. For the continuous European critique cf. the nu-
merous written and oral questions in the European Parliament on human rights in Iran in the bibliography. 
80 cf. Kramer, Martin: ‘The Global Village of Islam’, in: Ayalon, Ami (ed.): Middle East Contemporary Survey, vol.166, 
1992. Boulder et al., 1995, pp.193-226, here p.208f. Rushdie had kept a low profile in 1991 but in 1992 toured Western 
countries to promote his case and ask for pressure on Iran. In November the bounty on his murder was doubled. Cf. ‘Reward 
increased for Rushdie’s death’, Financial Times, 3.11.1992, p.1. 
81 cf. Mauthner, Robert: ‘Britain protests over Rushdie death call’, Financial Times, 13.11.1992, p.4. 
82 cf. ‘Germany reportedly says Iran will be held responsible for Rushdie’s fate’, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (BBC 
SWB); Part 4, The Middle East, ME/1564, A/3, 15.12.1992. 
83 cf. Rieck, ‘Iran 1992’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1992, fn.58, pp.78-85, here p.81. The Iranian Kazem Darabi and the Lebanese 
Abbas Rhayel and Joussef Amin were arrested in October 1992 and charged with murder in March 1993 by the federal 
prosecutor, The Iranian Security Service is mentioned to have ordered the assassinations. For a chronology of the trial cf. 
‘Vom Attentat bis zum Richterspruch’ (From the Attack to the Verdict), Die Welt, 11.4.1997. 
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Fourth, the annexation of the Abu Musa and Tunb islands in the Gulf by Iran caused 
friction with the Gulf states and severely hampered Iranian prospects to enter into an 
integrated regional security arrangement.84 
Fifth, the fierce Iranian opposition to the Arab-Israeli Peace-Process and the support 
for Hamas directly contradicted the intensified EC-support for a peaceful settlement. 
Hamas opened an office in Tehran in 1992 and in October a Hamas delegation was 
invited to Tehran meeting both the religious leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamene’i 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati.85 
Sixth, allegations emerged that Iran was attempting to construct nuclear weapons and 
was refitting its army with offensive conventional weaponry. The CIA estimated that 
Iran would be able to construct nuclear weapons until the year 2000. Iran argued that 
its nuclear programme was subject to regular inspections by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) who had found no evidence for the report.86 
These developments contradicted European principles of respect for human rights and 
international security enshrined in the CFSP. The normalisation of relations with Iran 
became inconceivable - at least for the time being.87 Hence the ‘critical dialogue’ was 
declared to change Iranian policies to respect international norms. The policy was not 
altruistic. European interests in Gulf stability and trade always underlay this policy. 
But for the first time the EU took human rights as a priority in its relations with Iran, 
making improvements a precondition for closer ties and mutual trust.88 
The Concept of the ‘Critical Dialogue’ 
The ‘critical dialogue’ was announced at the European Council (the meeting of the 
Council of Ministers) in Edinburgh in December 1992. It reflected both the convic-
tion that Iran was too important to be regionally isolated and the deep concerns about 
its domestic and foreign policies: 
“Given Iran’s importance in the region, the European Council reaffirms its belief that a dia-
logue should be maintained with the Iranian Government. This should be a critical dialogue 
which reflects concern about Iranian behaviour and calls for improvement in a number of ar-
eas, particularly human rights, the death sentence pronounced by a Fatwa of Ayatollah 
Khomeini against the author Salman Rushdie, which is contrary to international law, and ter-
rorism. Improvement in these areas will be important in determining the extent to which closer 
relations and confidence can be developed.”89 
                                                 
84 Some argued, however, that the incident did not impair relations with the Gulf states, cf. Kostiner, Joseph: ‘The Search for 
Gulf Security; The Politics of Collective Defense’, in: Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS), vol.166, 1992. Boulder et 
al., 1995, pp.227-242, here p.235f. 
85 cf. Kramer, Martin: ‘The Global Village of Islam’, in: MECS, fn.84, pp.193-226, here p.204f. 
86 cf. Rieck, ‘Iran 1992’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1992, fn.58, pp.78-85, here p.80. 
87 cf. Halliday, ‘Elusive Normalization’, fn.78, p.326. 
88 cf. Regelsberger, ‘GASP 1992/93’, fn.38, p.226. 
89 ‘European Council in Edinburgh’, fn.2, §15. 
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Additionally, the Council expressed concern about “Iran’s arms procurement” and the 
“wish that Iran will take a constructive approach” to the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.90 
While Iran interpreted the statement as signifying “disparate views” between those 
closer to the U.S. (i.e. Britain) and those preferring a positive attitude on Iran91, the 
declaration in fact represented the first unified and consistent European policy to-
wards Iran that held strong for five years. 
In the context of European foreign policy, calling a dialogue with a third country 
‘critical’ can be interpreted as special form of the institutionalized ‘political dia-
logue’ that the EU had established with several countries and organizations.92 Since 
Euro-Iranian relations lacked the preconditions to establish a proper ‘political dia-
logue’, the unprecedented form of ‘critical dialogue was chosen, clearly suggesting 
the prospect of being translated into a ‘political dialogue’ once Iran adhered to inter-
national norms. 
Five major principles of the ‘critical dialogue’ can be identified: 
First, the EU was determined to apply a multilateral policy towards Iran respecting 
the measures agreed by the United Nations to oppose states breaking international 
law.93 Since the UN did not apply sanctions or even military steps against Iran, the 
EU stuck to the ‘civil’ measure of diplomatic engagement. 
Second, the EU’s policy aimed at strengthening allegedly ‘moderate’ politicians in 
Iran. Hence the EU took account of the internal factionalism, trying to weaken ‘radi-
cals’ who opposed rapprochement and supported a ‘revolutionary’ foreign policy. 
Third, the EU respected the fact that Iran was inspected regularly by the IAEA who 
did not find evidence for nuclear armament in Iran. The EU refrained from punishing 
Iran simply on the allegation that it pursued a policy of nuclear armament.94 
Fourth, the European Union stressed that Iran was signatory to both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and that 
it had the duty to act according to the principles the government had signed up to.95 
And finally and most importantly, the EU emphasized again and again that the only 
possibility to achieve changes in the Iranian behaviour was to communicate European 
concerns rather than to ‘bully’ Iran. As the German government emphasised, 
                                                 
90 ‘European Council in Edinburgh’, fn.2, §16 and §17. 
91 cf. ‘Tehran Radio Comments on EC Leaders’, BBC SWB; Part 4, ME/1564, A/2, 15.12.1992. 
92 on ‘political dialogue’ cf. Monar, Jörg: ‘Political Dialogue with Third Countries and Regional Political Groupings; The 
Fifteen as an Attractive Interlocutor’, in: Regelsberger, Elfriede; Schoutheete de Tervarent, Philippe de; Wessels, Wolfgang 
(eds.): Foreign Policy of the European Union; From EPC to CFSP and Beyond, London, 1997, pp.263-274. 
93 cf. statement of Commissioner van Miert, in: Debates of the European Parliament, No 4-482/279. 
94 cf. European Parliament, Written Question No 2170/92 to European Political Cooperation (1 September 1992), Official 
Journal No. C 58, 1993, Item 56 (93/C 58/56). Subject: Report to the Republican members of the US Congress House of 
Representatives alleging that Iran has nuclear weapons. Internal reports by the German foreign ministry, however, expressed 
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1992), Official Journal No. C 106, 1993, Item 64; (93/C 106/64). Subject: Baha’i community in Iran. 
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“convincing” Iranian politicians through a “gradual process of long-term persuasion” 
was the essence of the ‘critical dialogue’.96 
Implementation of the ‘Critical Dialogue’ 
The ‘critical dialogue’ involved both measures on the European and on the member-
state level. The discussion of the multifaceted implementation of the dialogue will be 
reduced to the most important steps taken. 
The general way to communicate EU-concerns on the Council of Ministers’ level 
were confidential démarches, public declarations, and regular meetings of the EU-
Troika with Iranian officials.97 The European Commission also regularly criticised 
Iranian human rights abuses in its meetings with Iranian officials. And the European 
Parliament ‘checked’ both the Council’s and the Commission’s measures by continu-
ously tabling human rights resolutions condemning Iran and asking critical questions 
in Parliament to hold up the awareness of the situation in the Islamic Republic.98 
Since 1985 the European Commission had sponsored resolutions in the UN Commis-
sion on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly to condemn Iranian human 
rights abuses. This remained the core multilateral effort of public critique. Continuos 
pressure was exerted on the Iranian regime to allow visits of the United Nations Spe-
cial Representative (UNSR) since Iran had refused him access from 1993 onwards.99 
On the specific charges against Iran, consistent efforts were made to persuade Iran to 
adhere to internationally accepted norms. 
In the case of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, the emphasis lay on raising the in-
ternational awareness for the author and on reaching a written assurance from Iran 
not to pursue any attempt to kill the writer. In December 1993 Commissioner Hans 
van den Broek met Rushdie and made clear that 
“improvements in human rights and the lifting of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie” as well 
as “respect for fundamental human rights and international law remain essential for the de-
velopment of closer relations with Iran.”100 
In 1994 Rushdie met the EU-Troika and the awareness of his fate was raised by nu-
merous meetings with state-officials all over Europe. Under the French presidency 
                                                 
96 ‘Ergebnisse des ‘kritischen Dialogs’ mit dem Iran über Menschenrechtsfragen; Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die 
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sache 13/3485, 16.01.1996, p.4 (Translation M.S.). 
97 cf. European Parliament, Oral Questions No H-519/93 on security of Iranian political refugees and exiles in Community 
countries, H-535/93 on the violation of Security Council Resolution 598 by Iran, H.537/93 on Iran’s foreign debt crises, H-
557/93 on the brutal suppression of unrest in Iran, 26.5.1993, EPC-Bulletin, 1993, Doc.93/216, pp.273-277, here p.216f. 
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100 ‘Mr. van den Broek Meets Salman Rushdie’, Press Releases and Declarations, 9.12.1993, IP/93/1080. 
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the fatwa was again condemned101 and an initiative taken to negotiate a written 
Iranian assurance not to pursue the fatwa. The Troika failed to reach such an agree-
ment, provoking growing distrust in the strength of the ‘pragmatist’ faction in Iranian 
policy.102 
The British government still regards such a statement as a precondition to improve 
relations.103 With the ‘Mykonos’-trial reaching its height in Autumn 1996, the EU is-
sued the strongest statement so far condemning the fatwa and calling on Rafsanjani 
“to take appropriate steps against any initiative that might endanger ongoing efforts 
to reach a solution.”104 After the suspension of the ‘critical dialogue’ the fatwa was 
condemned in February 1998, albeit recognising the “new Iranian Government’s 
stated commitment to respect the rule of law” hoping that “this will take us towards 
the assurances that we need to remove the threat to Salman Rushdie’s life.”105 The 
declaration was firmly underscored by the British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook who 
met Salman Rushdie on the day of the issuing, demanding both a “written assurance” 
by the Iranian government “not to do anything to further the fatwah” and an effort to 
remove the bounty placed on Rushdie’s head by the 15 Khordad foundation.106 
Concerning the alleged Iranian support for international ‘terrorism’, little was done 
publicly since the EU claimed it had no concrete evidence to support allegations that 
Iran directly sponsored terrorist acts.107 Yet after a series of suicide bombings in Is-
rael in 1996 the EU came under intensified internal and external pressure to justify 
its dialogue with Iran despite alleged Iranian support for Hizballah and Hamas.108 
The Troika sent a mission to Iran (and Libya/Syria), to persuade these countries to 
disassociate itself from terrorism.109 Due to this pressure, President Rafsanjani 
declared for the first time that Iran distanced itself from the attacks against Israel 
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Salman Rushdie’, 13.2.1995, PESC/95/18. 
102 Rieck, ‘Iran 1995’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1995, fn.58, pp.80-87, here p.83. 
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saying that Iran “opposes terrorism regardless of its perpetrators, even if it is 
committed by Hamas.”110 Iran also notably reduced support for Hizballah, yet it still 
defended its support for the opposition to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon as 
legitimate.111 
With regard to the assassinations of Iranian dissidents abroad, Gary Sick noted that 
apart from the killing of a former Iranian diplomat and opposition leader in Rome in 
March 1993 there have been no documented cases of further Iranian assassinations in 
Europe.112 Whether this development was influenced by European pressure in the 
framework of the ‘critical dialogue’ lacks evidence. As we will discuss below, France 
tried to avoid trials against Iranian diplomats on these charges. 
It was only in November 1996 during the ongoing ‘Mykonos’-trial in Berlin that the 
EU openly condemned threats voiced in Iran against German nationals.113 Demonstra-
tors in Iran had called for a fatwa against the German federal prosecutor who had di-
rectly charged the Iranian leadership with ordering the assassinations.114 
On 10 April 1997 the Council of Ministers acknowledged that a German court had 
found the direct involvement of the Iranian authorities in the killings and condemned 
this as “totally unacceptable in the conduct of international affairs.” The constructive 
relationship with Iran could make “no progress (..) while Iran flouts international 
norms, and indulges in acts of terrorism.”115 Accordingly, the European ambassadors 
were recalled from Iran and the ‘critical dialogue’ was suspended. 
In April the Council of Ministers reiterated the declaration calling on Iran to abide 
“by its commitments under international agreements, including those concerning the non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as those concerning human rights.”116 
The European reaction to the Mykonos-verdict demonstrated that the EU was only 
ready to act when concrete evidence was produced that Iran had committed an act of 
violence. The same conduct was applied to Iran’s alleged quest for nuclear armament. 
As long as the IAEA found no hints in Iran for the construction of nuclear weapons, 
the EU dismissed American concerns as unfounded.117 Yet one has to bear in mind 
                                                 
110 ‘Rafsanjani: We Support the Palestinian Struggle but We Reject any Terrorist Act’, Al Hayat, 12.3.1996, quoted in: 
Gerges; Fawaz A.: ‘Washington’s Misguided Iran Policy’, Survival, vol.38, no.4, Winter 1996-97, p.10. 
111 cf. Gerges, ib., p.10f. 
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that most of the measures taken by the EU were confidential and it can be assumed 
that the Union’s representatives used their contacts to exert pressure. 
On the member-state level, various bilateral initiatives were taken under the heading 
of the ‘critical dialogue’, yet it would lead too far to assess those in detail. 
Most notably, the German government organized two ‘Human Rights Seminars’ with 
Iran in which experts discussed openly conceptions of human rights and European 
concerns about repression in Iran.118 The sessions brought together international law-
yers and human rights experts and were designed to foster understanding about West-
ern and Islamic perceptions of human rights. They were also used to express concerns 
on human rights abuses and to demand concrete improvements. Yet while the 1992 
seminar took place in an ‘open’ atmosphere and included ‘liberal’ thinkers like 
Abdelkarim Soroush, the Teheran-meeting in 1994 was characterized by antagonism 
signalling a setback on the way to reconciliation. 
As the only EU member-state Denmark decided in August 1996 to end the ‘critical 
dialogue’ with Iran on bilateral basis. Though it kept up the dialogue on the European 
level, the Danish Foreign Secretary declared that the policy “had shown no results” 
and that “it did not make sense to talk to [the Iranians]”.119 Instead the Danish Parlia-
ment passed a motion calling on the government to start talks with Iranian opposition 
groups.120 These talks took place several times, yet a ministry’s official said that the 
expatriate opposition was highly divided making a dialogue very difficult.121 
V. Evaluation of the ‘Critical Dialogue’ 
A policy of persuasive diplomacy such as the ‘critical dialogue’ is not likely to pro-
duce tangible results. The confidentiality of the démarches and details of ministerial 
meetings leaves the proper evaluation of such policies to historians. Yet diplomatic 
confidentiality becomes problematic if a democratic society charges its politicians 
with hypocrisy and demands explanations for its foreign policy. 
The ‘critical dialogue’, against all odds, achieved changes in Iranian behaviour. The 
core issues of the dialogue: human rights, the fatwa against Rushdie, terrorism, op-
position to the Peace Process, and proliferation deserve scrutinizing. Most impor-
tantly, one should look at the possible influence of the dialogue on the election of 
President Muhammed Khatami, though it will be difficult to assess. 
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Impact on Iran’s Domestic Human Rights Conduct 
It is difficult to do justice to the changes in the human rights situation in Iran, espe-
cially due to the lack of information. Yet the reports of the UN Special Representa-
tives on Human Rights (UNSR) provide a basis on which judgements can be made. 
In general, the human rights situation in Iran gives reason to serious concern, and the 
grave violations specified in the 1992 report of the UNSR continue: 
“excessive use of the death penalty; lack of guarantees of due process of law; discriminations 
against citizens because of religious beliefs, specifically the Baha’is; and the absence of inde-
pendent associations and a climate of legal certainty and guarantees for the expression of the 
literary and artistic thought and creativity.”122 
While in 1990 the UNSR Galindo Pohl could announce some improvements in Iran’s 
cooperation with the UN123, until 1996 no major changes in the domestic human 
rights conduct were observed. From 1992 to April 1996 Iran refused to let the UNSR 
into the country despite massive critique from the European Union. 
Yet Iran began slowly to set up institutions reflecting at least an awareness that the 
continuous international criticism had to be answered. In 1992, prior to the beginning 
of the dialogue, the Foreign Ministry appointed a representative on human rights, in 
1993 the Majlis set up a ‘Committee on Human Rights’, in May 1995 the ‘Islamic 
Human Rights Commission’ (ICHR) was founded124, and the Foreign Ministry estab-
lished a ‘Department of Human Rights’.125 Both the German government and the 
UNSR welcomed this “creation of new structures” as a “tangible” progress.126 
In February 1996 the new UNSR Maurice Copithorne was admitted to his first “intro-
ductory” visit to Iran. But the Iranian government denied him a second visit in 
December arguing that his report had been abused by “certain countries” to “re-
inforce their pre-judgements and pre-drawn conclusions” against Iran.127 Despite this 
setback Copithorne’s second report in 1997 gave evidence of major changes in the 
public debate on human rights in Iran. He attested a positive attitude on human rights 
issues to the political elite, saw changes in the status of women, and a much more 
open and controversial political debate in the general public and the press. 
Copithorne concluded saying there was “no doubt that progress is being made.”128 
The report obviously reflected the public mood in Iran prior to the election of 
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President Khatami, who’s campaign had focused on women’s rights, the rule of law 
and the freedom of expression. 
These improvements, however, must be viewed in the light of the serious violations 
of human rights that occurred during the years of the ‘critical dialogue’. Hundreds of 
people were imprisoned without trial, many for political reasons, torture was regu-
larly used to reach false statements, corporal punishments like mutilation and public 
flogging continued, and hundreds of people were executed without proper trial. The 
Baha’i community was subject to political persecution, many of its leaders impris-
oned and some executed, causing especially grave concern in Europe. 
As already indicated, public officials still voiced their determination to pursue the 
fatwa against Salman Rushdie, clearly indicating their disrespect for international 
norms. In April 1996, the President of the ICHR Ayatollah Yazdi, made a statement 
openly contradicting the governments position not to pursue the fatwa: 
“The fatwa applies to all Muslims and will eventually be carried out one day, at the appropri-
ate time. The Rushdie matter will be resolved through application of the fatwa. We cannot re-
solve it through negotiations or under pressure from this or that country. The fatwa creates an 
obligation for Muslims in their personal capacity, not for States.”129 
Such statements as well as other incidents of human rights violations were clearly de-
signed to weaken the ‘moderate’s’ position both domestically and internationally. 
As a matter of major Western concern, the popular Iranian writer and editor of the 
monthly Adineh (Friday) Faraj Sarkuhi was arrested during a meeting with the cultu-
ral attaché of the German embassy at the height of the controversy over the Mykonos-
trial in November 1996 and later charged with espionage.130 In a letter smuggled out-
side Iran and published by major newspapers, Sarkuhi made his ordeal of torture and 
unjust imprisonment public in the West131, provoking yet another international con-
demnation of Iran. The German Foreign Minister reacted strongly, announcing the 
fate of Sarkuhi would be one of the first matters to be discussed if relations with Iran 
are to be restored.132 Sarkuhi was finally released from prison in January 1998133 and 
lives in Germany since May 1998. In an interview with the German daily 
Süddeutsche Zeitung he voiced his desire to return to Iran to continue his journalistic 
work.134 
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In summary, improvements in the realm of human rights have been ambiguous, yet 
the election of Khatami discussed below clearly signified the slight ‘opening’ of the 
Iranian system and slight improvements in human rights conduct. 
Impact on Iran’s Foreign Policy 
In contrast to human rights, changes in Iran’s foreign policy have been both tangible 
and significant, however, again, ambiguous due to the internal power-struggle. The 
foreign policy of the Islamic Republic is directed by the spiritual leader Ayatollah 
Khamene’i, who has consistently thwarted moves towards reconciliation with the 
West. While initially perceived by some as a ‘technocrat’ whose favour for an ‘open’ 
economy was interpreted as a rather ‘pragmatic’ position135, Khamene’i was a major 
brake in moves towards a ‘moderate’ foreign policy, and his continuing power will 
definitely determine the extent of moderation under President Khatami. 
In the regional sphere Iran showed readiness to reconciliation with its neighbours, 
both in the Central Asian republics and the Gulf.136 Iran engaged in UN-negotiations 
for a peace-agreement in Afghanistan137, and made several overtures to the GCC-sta-
tes for rapprochement. Apart from unresisted intrusions into Iraqi territory to fight 
the Liberation Army of the Mujahedin e-Khalq138, Iran showed no aspirations to mili-
tarily threatening Gulf stability.139 Iran took part in several negotiations over a peace-
ful settlement of the Musa-Island dispute, although little progress has been made so 
far.140 While the United States emphasised Iran’s threatening military and potentially 
nuclear capabilities, the Gulf states seemed to perceive a lessening threat from Iran, 
while Iraq remained to be perceived as a constant danger to Gulf security.141 
Iran’s position towards the Peace Process was ambiguous throughout, although harsh 
rhetoric against any peace-agreement and support for the radical Palestinian resis-
tance was tamed down, the latter allegedly reduced to financial rather than military 
aid.142 Setbacks were continuing, most notably when the allegedly ‘moderate’ 
President Rafsanjani called the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin ‘the realization of 
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God’s promise to take revenge’.143 In an unprecedented move the German Parliament 
passed a motion condemning the words and most embarrassingly, called on the gov-
ernment to disinvite Foreign Minister Velayati144 who had been expected to an Islam-
Conference in Bonn organized by Foreign Minister Kinkel.145 Kinkel called off the 
conference instead of following the motion, a major setback and embarrassment for 
German Iran policy.146 
Yet the greatest inconsistencies with regard to the ‘critical dialogue’ was the Europe-
an treatment of assassinations of members of the Iranian opposition abroad. In 
France, the trial for the murder of former Iranian prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar in 
1991 collapsed due to lack of evidence. Two suspects supposed to be extradited to 
Switzerland on charges of having assassinated the brother of an Iranian opposition 
leader Kazem Rayavi in 1990 were ‘expelled’ to Iran for the reason of “national 
interest”.147 
In Germany the trial for the murder of four leading members of the Iranian-Kurdish 
opposition in September 1992, i.e. shortly before the ‘critical dialogue’ was announ-
ced, was contradicted by alleged German cooperation with the Iranian secret serv-
ice.148 The Iranian Minister for Security, Ali Fallahian, was welcomed in Bonn by the 
government’s secret-service co-ordinator Schmidbauer and praised the good coopera-
tion of German and Iranian secret services, while the state-prosecution considered to 
issue a warrant on Fallahian for his indirect involvement in the assassination.149 Al-
though Schmidbauer managed to negotiate the exchange of prisoners of war between 
the Iranian-sponsored Hizballah in Lebanon and Israel150, his contacts were hard to 
justify, and pressure on the government grew to severe ties with Iran.151 
In April 1997, the Kammergericht (Court of Appeal) in Berlin ruled in an unexpect-
edly frank verdict152 that the political leadership of Iran (i.e. the Spiritual Leader, the 
President, the Foreign Minister, and the Secrete Service Minister), represented in a 
Committee for Special Operations alleged to have authority over such decisions, had 
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directly ordered the killings of four Kurdish opposition leaders in the Mykonos-Res-
taurant in Berlin in December 1992. While not naming Iran’s leaders, the court ruled 
that the Committee, consisting inter alia of the Spiritual Leader, the President, the 
Foreign Minister, and the Secret Service Minister, had instructed the latter, Ali Falla-
hian, to organise the assassinations.153 The verdict provided the first direct proof for 
what was widely condemned as Iranian “state-terrorism”.154 The German state-prose-
cution is legally obliged to investigate the charges against the Iranian leadership, 
even though German law does not apply to the representatives of foreign countries.155 
The written opinion of the court in March 1998 reiterated that the Iranian leadership 
had assassinated dissidents “for the sake of pure preservation of power”.156 
It was only with the Berlin verdict that the ‘critical dialogue’ was suspended and the 
European ambassadors were recalled from Iran.157 This opened the door for harsh 
criticism that the EU did not take Iranian terrorist activities serious. And when after 
two weeks the Council decided that the ambassadors could return, the doubts were 
strengthened that the EU lacked the commitment to exert pressure on Iran.158 
It must be remembered, though, that the murder in Berlin took place before the ‘criti-
cal dialogue’ was declared. To combine the fate of the dialogue with the Berlin-ver-
dict is historically inaccurate. Yet the dialogue had been based on the weak convicti-
on that Khamene’i and Rafsanjani represented a ‘moderate’ strand in Iranian politics 
worth supporting, and now these alleged ‘moderates’ were warranted for murder. 
The Iranian reaction to the verdict was milder than expected. President Rafsanjani 
called it an action of “propaganda” and threatened with consequences, while the For-
eign Ministry doubted the proof and circumstantial evidence given by the court.159 In 
what could be interpreted as a last retaliation, Rafsanjani declared at the end of his 
presidency that the European ambassadors could come back to Tehran, but the Danish 
and German, for their harsher stance on human rights, had to be last.160 
                                                 
153 ‘Auszüge aus der mündlichen Urteilsverkündung’, fn.6, p.129. Former Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, a core 
witness, , who’s descriptions of the internal structure of the regime were later backed up by ‘witness C’, a dissident of the 
Iranian secret service, laid down his allegations in various interviews: ‘A Network of Terror’, The Middle East, April 1997, 
pp.17f.; ‘Bonn ist erpreßbar’ (Bonn could be Blackmailed), Der Spiegel, no.36, 1996, p.24. 
154 cf. Geitner, Paul: ‘Germany Rules on Iran Killing’, Associated Press, 10.10.1997; Leicht, Robert: ‘Das Mykonos-Urteil 
zwingt zum Bruch mit Teheran’ (The Mykonos-Verdict Forces the Breach with Tehran), Die Zeit, no.17, 18.04.97. 
155 Cf. Prantl, Heribert: ‘Drohen und abwarten; Haftbefehle gegen Irans Repräsentanten sind Makulatur’ (Threatening and 
Waiting), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10.4.1997, p.10; ‘Nach dem Mykonos-Urteil; Karlsruhe prüft neue Verfahren; Ermittlungen 
gegen Regierungsmitglieder Irans möglich’ (German State Prosecution Considers New Law-Suits), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
17.04.97. 
156 cf. ‘Urteilsbegründung zu Mykonos; Iran begeht Terroranschläge im Ausland’ (The Court’s Opinion on Mykonos; Iran 
Commits Attacks of Terror Abroad), German Press Agency, 29.3.1998. (translation M.S.) 
157 cf. ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Iran’, Brussels, 10.4.1997, PESC/97/32. Only 
Greece hesitated 7 days to recall its ambassador, emphasising its determination to continue the ‘critical dialogue’. Cf. ‘Iran 
droht Deutschland mit Konsequenzen’ (Iran threatens Germany with Consequences), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.4.1997, p.1. 
158 Lüders, Michael: ‘Schamfrist, ultrakurz’ (A very Short Period of Grace), Die Zeit, 9.5.1997, p.6. 
159 cf. ‘Iran droht Deutschland mit Konsequenzen’, fn.157. 
160 Motahari, Farshid: ‘Iran’s Surprising No to Return of German Ambassador to Tehran’, German Press Agency, 30.4.1997. 
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Even if normal relations are beginning to resume now (see below), the EU was not 
cautious enough on Iran’s alleged foreign policy ‘moderation’. Any incidents related 
to Iranian authorities should be vigorously pursued, even for the price of temporarily 
severing ties with Iran. The claim that the naming of the Iranian leadership in the 
verdict had an effect on the Iranian elections namely in fostering the determination to 
vote for a different government is difficult to prove, yet it provides an incentive of 
being consistently ‘critical’ in the next future.161 
Impact on Euro-Iranian Trade Relations 
The general critique against an inconsequential human rights policy that defies to use 
economic sanctions as a tangible means of pressure is that it is determined by com-
mercial interests rather than principle.162 Europeans, it has been argued by Patrick 
Clawson, “see Iran as a market worth selling their souls for”. The United States, in-
stead, were aware of the little importance of the Iranian market and ready to sacrifice 
their business interests to counter the “rogue state” Iran.163 
                                                 
161 cf. interview with Udo Steinbach: ‘Die Zeiten eines Fallahian sind vorbei’, Tageszeitung, 10.04.97, p.14. 
162 cf. Heinrich, ‘Kritik des ‘Kritischen Dialogs’’, fn.13, p.541, 543: “Unhindered foreign trade-relations need ideological 
camouflage due to the rhetorical efforts made in this country [Germany] for human rights and civic freedom. Nothing else is 
provided by the critical dialogue.” (Translation M.S.). For the example of China, where the U.S. pursues a policy of 
‘constructive engagement’ despite heavy criticism of ‘double-standards’, cf. Tonelson, Alan: ‘Jettison the Policy’; and Pos-
ner, Michael: ‘Rally Round Human Rights’, Foreign Policy, no.97, Winter 1994-95, pp.121-139. 
163 Clawson, ‘What to do about Iran’, fn.13, p.39. 
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The Euro-Iranian trade balance, however, does not substantiate this allegation. It is 
true that especially France and Germany are strong competitors for the Iranian mar-
ket, and Germany is Iran’s main trading partner. Yet economic relations with Iran 
have dropped since 1992 (see Table 1), trade was restricted, and as already said, the 
EU made improvements inter alia in Iran’s human rights record a precondition for 
closer economic ties, leading eventually to a Euro-Iranian trade agreement. 
The Euro-Iranian trade-record must be viewed in the light of Iranian measures to curb 
imports due to sinking oil-prices and increasing American pressure, and in the light 
of general Iranian economic difficulties. Iran applied import-substituting measures to 
curb its trade-deficit and to pay off external debts mainly in European countries.165 
The impact of U.S. sanctions played also a role in scaring-off European investors and 
in reducing Iranian external investments. 
European exports sank by 42 per cent between 1992 and 1996 while imports from 
Iran were only slightly reduced. In the case of Germany, Iran’s main trading partner, 
                                                 
164 Eurostat; Außen- und Intrahandel der EU; Monatliche Statistiken (Foreign and Internal Trade of the EU), Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, no.4, 1998, Luxembourg, 1998, pp.42, 46, 43, 50. The original data is given in ECU 
and has been converted into US-$ according to the exchange rates given by Eurostat. 
165 Amuzegar, Johangir: ‘Iran’s Economy and the US Sanctions’, Middle East Journal, vol.51, no.2, Spring 1997, pp.185-
199, here p.189f. 
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exports to Iran were curbed to one fourth between 1992 and 1996, while imports re-
mained at a constantly low level.166 (detailed tables are given in the Appendix) 
Euro-Iranian trade was subject to both multilateral and bilateral restrictions. Eu-
ropean firms were not allowed to deliver any armament to Iran, despite continuing 
allegations of illegal exports.167 Due to American pressure, exports of dual-use168 
products to Iran were reduced, and a plan of the German firm Siemens to finish 
building a nuclear plant in Busher begun under the Shah was finally cancelled.169 
In 1995 Germany sent an economic delegation to Iran and decided to offer so-called 
Hermes-credit-guarantees of 150 million German Mark to revitalise economic rela-
tions. Although these guarantees were comparatively little in volume, they provoked 
serious critique from the U.S. and Israeli governments.170 
In March 1995 U.S. President Clinton decided to veto an agreement of the U.S. firm 
Conoco to invest $1 billion in oil and Gas-fields in the Persian Gulf and in April de-
clared a total boycott of trade and investment with Iran.171 The French firm Total 
took the opportunity to negotiate a new agreement together with the Russian Gaz-
prom and the Malaysian Petronas despite fierce critique from the United States. The 
deal was signed in September 1997, immediately acompanied by a statement of the 
European Commission urging the U.S.not to take action under the ILSA.172 
In February 1997 Iran declared that it was offered “more than $5 billion in govern-
ment-backed loan guarantees from Europe and Japan over the last 18 months” and 
that European countries had helped to reschedule about $22 billion in Iranian 
debts.173 
Neither the Hermes-credits and the Total-deal, nor the rescheduling of debts were 
made with at least publicly hinting at a trade-off between human rights improvements 
and revitalising trade. Although the deals did not fell directly under considerations of 
the ‘critical dialogue’, they gave weight to the argument that French and German 
economic interests were at times far stronger than human rights concerns. 
In general, the promise of a Euro-Iranian trade-agreement discussed before the 
‘critical dialogue’ was announced, however dim its prospects, remained one of the 
                                                 
166 cf. ‘Wirtschaft: Iran-Handel seit langem rückläufig’ (Economy: Iran-Trade has been in Decline for long)’, Woche im 
Bundestag, no.7, 23.4.1997. 
167 cf. Fitchett, Joseph: ‘France Denies Selling Missiles to Iran in Exchange for Peace’, International Herald Tribune, 
24.3.1995, p.10. 
168 ‘Dual-use’ technologies are products that have both civil and military use, such as Computers etc. 
169 cf. Lane, Charles: Germany’s New Ostpolitik, Foreign Affairs, vol.74, no.6, Nov.-Dec. 1995, pp.77-89, here p.83. 
170 cf. Alkazaz, Aziz: ‘Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zum Nahen Osten’ (Economic Relations with the Middle East), in: Na-
host-Jahrbuch 1995, fn.58, p.17. 
171 Rieck, ‘Iran 1995’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1995, fn.58, p.82. 
172 cf. The Echo of Iran, no.113, October 1997, p.22f.; ‘Total Contract in Iran’, Statement by Sir Leon Brittan, 30.9.1997, 
IP/97/825. 
173 Friedman, Alan: ‘Europe and Iran are Guaranteeing $5 Billion in Loans, Tehran Reports’, International Herald Tribune, 
3.2.1997. 
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‘carrots’ in the background.174 Since such an agreement would have been subject to 
human rights conditionality by the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers had to press for improvements in Iranian behaviour. 
In summary, economic relations with Iran did not flourish due to the ‘critical dia-
logue’. European economic stakes in Iran were often exaggerated and cannot be gen-
erally assumed to be the only reason hindering the EU to impose sanctions against 
Iran. During 1997 while relations were severed and the ‘dialogue’ suspended, com-
mercial relations even recovered significantly. Thus it is hard to claim the ‘critical 
dialogue’ was a policy of ‘business as usual’ with a moral colouring. 
The Council argued that trade with Iran was benefiting the ‘pragmatists’ who could 
only move towards a conciliatory foreign policy if the domestic economic situation 
was recovering. And in absence of multilateral UN-measures against Iran, the EU 
saw no legitimate ground for the imposition of sanctions as long as Iran did not pose 
a grave threat to international security. Commissioner Karel van Miert made clear 
that “the European Union has consistently opposed the use of embargoes except 
where specifically approved by the United nations.”175 
VI. The Controversy over the ‘Critical Dialogue’ 
The ‘critical dialogue’ was continuously and fiercely criticised. The coalition of cri-
tics brought together a bizarre mixture of right-wing Senators as well as government-
officials in the United States, left-wingers and social-democrats in Europe, human 
rights groups, and the multifaceted Iranian opposition-in-exile. 
Yet the critique was seldom based on similar assumptions, and especially in the 
American case did little justice to the normative nature of the critical dialogue. 
The American Policy of ‘Isolating’ Iran 
The American policy of “active containment” against Iran was based on traditional 
perceptions of the ‘balance of power’ in the Gulf. Outlined by Martin Indyk in May 
1993 the policy “derives from the assessment that the current Iraqi and Iranian re-
gimes are both hostile to American interests in the region.”176 While the preceding 
U.S.-approach had been to depend on one power to counter the other, a policy of 
“dual containment” was proposed to contain both states in an equal manner.177 Its 
core objective was “to preserve a balance of power in our [the American] favour in 
the wider Middle East region”, while it was in the same time assumed to enhance the 
                                                 
174 cf. Commissioner Martin Bangemann: “(..) we were not prepared to conclude the cooperation agreement which Iran had 
requested. In all our talks we have stressed the fact that the resolution of the human rights issue is a precondition for the 
conclusion of any such agreement (..).” Debates of the European Parliament, 15.6.1995, no.4-464, p.211. 
175 Debates of the European Parliament, 24.5.1996, no.4-482, p.279; cf. also Commissioner Vanni d’Archirafi, ibid., 
22.4.1993, no.3-430, p.284: “economic sanctions must be based on an international consensus (..)”. 
176 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’, fn.3, p.4. For an analysis of ‘dual containment’ cf. 
Sick, ‘Rethinking Dual Containment’, fn.112, pp.6-8. 
177 ibid., p.3f. 
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American efforts to promote the Arab-Israeli Peace Process.178 At least in its out-
line179, neither human rights nor the internal dimension of Iranian politics played a 
role in formulating this explicitly unilateral policy: 
”When we assess Iranian attentions and capabilities we see a dangerous combination for 
Western interests (..). It is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and assassination across the 
globe (..). We will pursue the effort of active containment unilaterally, maintaining the 
counter-terrorism sanctions (..) to encourage a change in Iranian behaviour.”180 
But despite the American trade-embargo against Iran of 1987181 the first two years of 
containment were undermined by American companies increasing their exports to 
Iran by 40 per cent between 1992 and 1993, while imports of Iranian oil for sale on 
the European market increased from $3,5 billion in 1992 to $4,3 billion in 1994 
making the U.S. the third major Iranian trading partner.182 The obvious discrepancy 
between harsh rhetoric and growing commercial relations became the core European 
argument to object U.S.-demands for multilateral Western sanctions against Iran. 
In June 1993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher tried unsuccessfully to convince 
EU-Ministers to impose a joint economic embargo on Iran, though he exerted 
pressure to at least reduce the export of ‘dual-use’ technology to Iran.183 The U.S.-
government successfully opposed a joint rescheduling of Iranian debts in the so-
called Paris-Club, forcing EU-countries and Japan to negotiate bilateral agreements 
with Iran.184 
Yet when the American oil company Conoco announced that it had signed a contract 
worth $1 billion with Iran to develop the Sirri gas field in the Persian Gulf, the out-
rage caused by the deal in the American public provoked President Clinton to impose 
a “comprehensive trade-embargo” against Iran.185 Issuing Executive Order 12957 the 
President declared “a national emergency”186 with respect to Iran “to prohibit the fi-
nancing, management or supervision by United States persons of the development of 
Iranian petroleum resources.”187 The Order was based on the American assertion that 
                                                 
178 ibid., p.3, 4. 
179 According to Gary Sick, ‘dual containment’ was later “refined and reordered” by Edward Djerejian, replacing the 
American objection to conventional weapons-purchases with Iran’s “dismal human-rights record”. cf. ‘Rethinking Dual 
Containment’, fn.112, p.8 and fn.10. Yet in general human rights plaid a minor role. Cf. ‘Statement of Robert H. Pelletreau, 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near East Affairs, Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East, 1.3.1994’, Middle East Policy, vol.3, no.1, 1994, pp.186-193, here p.190. 
180 Indyk, ‘The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East’, fn.3, p.5f. 
181 Since 1987 the import of goods and services of Iranian origin was prohibited due to Executive Order 12613 of 
29.10.1987, excluding, however, inter alia considerable oil-exports from Iran by American companies. 
182 Rieck, ‘Iran 1993’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1993, fn.58, p.80; Rieck, ‘Iran 1994’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1994, fn.58, p.82; Lane, 
‘Germany’s New Ostpolitik’, fn.169, p.78; Lancaster, John: ‘Iran Embargo Leaking Heavily’, Washington Post, 23.6.1995. 
183 cf. Rieck, ‘Iran1993’, Nahost-Jahrbuch 1993, fn.58, p.80. 
184 In total $15 billion of debts were rescheduled, mainly by Germany, France, Italy, and Japan. Cf. ibid., p.82. 
185 cf. Sick, ‘Rethinking Dual Containment’, fn.112, p.9f; ‘Report on Developments Concerning the National Emergency 
with Respect to Iran’, The White House, 13.09.1996. 
186 A “national emergency” with respect to Iran had been in place since the hostage crises of November 1979, the 1995 
declaration went explicitly further than that of 1979. 
187 ‘Executive Order 12957 Prohibiting the Transactions with respect to the Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources’, 
The White House, 15.3.1995. 
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“the actions and policies of the Government of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”188 
A second Executive Order prohibited all trade, trade financing, loans, related 
financial services and investments in Iran.189 As it is visible from table 4/5 the 
sanctions succeeded in preventing American trade with Iran, causing the 
restructuring of the Iranian economy to slow down190 and thereby increasing 
European fears that the ‘radicals’ could be further strengthened by economic reces-
sion.191 The American decision to impose sanctions was justified by the alleged 
Iranian sponsorship for terrorism, its activities to undermine the Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process, its alleged support for “groups seeking to subvert secular regimes in the 
Muslim world”, its quest for weapons of mass destruction, its conventional military 
build-up, and Iranian human rights abuses.192 
In a next move reflecting the anger at the EU’s refusal to join the embargo, Republi-
can Senator Alfonso D’Amato introduced a bill in Congress to sanction companies 
investing in the Iranian oil-industry, later implemented as the ‘Iran and Libya Sancti-
ons Act’ (ILSA). Sanctions were to be imposed on any company investing more than 
$40 Million (since 1997 $20 Million193) in the Iranian oil or gas sector. Investments 
in the petroleum-industry of a “rogue state” like Iran, D’Amato’s Aide explained, 
facilitated “Iran’s continuing aggression” and were “a threat to the national security 
and foreign policy of the United States.”194 The bill had especially been triggered by 
the quick replacement of Conoco by the French oil company Total in 1995. It 
constituted an unprecedented move by the Congress to impose penalties on non-
American companies dealing with Iran. President Clinton, despite reservations that 
the bill could harm transatlantic relations, signed the bill into law in August 1996 in 
the atmosphere created by the explosion of a TWA airliner and the bombing of the 
US military barracks at Al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia - both linked to Iran at the time.195 
These measures provoked strong European opposition. While the EU announced it 
shared US concerns over alleged Iranian sponsorship for terrorism, particularly the 
bill’s extraterritorial effects were opposed as a defiance of international law.196 
                                                 
188 ibid. 
189 ‘Executive Order 12959 Prohibiting Certain Transactions with respect to Iran’, The White House, 6.5.1995. 
190 Amuzegar argues, however, that most of these problems had internal rather than external reasons, cf. Amuzegar, ‘Iran’s 
Economy and the US Sanctions’, fn.165, pp.191-196. 
191 cf. Hollis ‘Europe and the Middle East’, fn.52, p.28; Jansen, Michael: ‘Iraq, Iran and Libya - the Impact of Sanctions’, 
Middle East International, 16 May 1997, pp.16-17. 
192 Tarnoff, ‘Containing Iran’, fn.4, p.47. 
193 Paul, Sonali: ‘U.S. Trigger for Iran Sanctions now $20 Million’, Reuters, 6.8.1997. 
194 ‘D’Amato Aide Defends US Iran/Libya Sanctions Act’ (Text of a presentation made by Gregg Rickman at the 17th 
Annual Oil and Money Conference in London on 29 October), MEES, 11.11.1996, p.D1-D3, here p.D2, D1. 
195 cf. Sick, ‘Rethinking Dual Containment’, fn.112, p.19; On the reservations, Tarnoff, ‘Containing Iran’, fn.4, p.52. 
196 cf. ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the Enactment of the D’Amato Legislation’. 
21.8.1996, PESC/96/72; ‘Irish Presidency and Commission Protested to the US Administration against the Iran/Libya 
Sanctions Act’. 9.8.1996, IP/96/793. 
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The EU’s refusal to join American sanctions had also been fostered by signs that at 
least some officials in the United States did not aim to change Iranian behaviour, but 
rather to weaken and destabilize the regime until it would be finally overthrown.197 
This belief had been inter alia provoked by a statement of the Foreign Secretary 
Warren Christopher in January 1995 who said that “we must isolate Iraq and Iran 
until there is a change in their governments”198. One year later Congress passed a bill 
authorising the CIA to mount an $18 million covert action programme “to change the 
nature of the government of Iran”199. Even if these statements and the Congress 
resolution did rather reflect the hostile American attitude than concrete measures to 
overthrow the Iranian regime, the general American position and the measures taken 
lead to an unprecedented rift in Transatlantic relations. 
Against the background of the emphasis on human rights taken here, the US approach 
of unilateral and in the EU’s view ‘illegal’200 sanctions against Iran provided no 
alternative for the ‘critical dialogue’. First, the EU had chosen an approach that took 
the Iranian domestic situation seriously and defied the logic of collectively punishing 
‘Iran as a state’.201 Second, the EU remained opposed to any measures contradicting 
international law, thus regarding a multilateral effort of the United Nations as a pre-
condition to legitimize sanctions against Iran. The EU never perceived Iran as an 
“outlaw” state202, but rather as a member of the international community that had to 
be persuaded, not bullied, to respect the norms and principles it has signed up to. 
The American Critics of the U.S.-Approach 
U.S. policy, however, was subject to strong domestic critique in the U.S. peaking in 
Spring 1997. Yet it was not the ignorance towards human rights that sparked the de-
mand for a “more nuanced approach” towards Iran, the core argument put forward by 
political analysts like Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy 
was rather that ‘dual containment’ had failed since it did in fact threaten the real 
American interests in the Gulf.203 The core points of critique were that Iran’s military 
                                                 
197 In fact, this is by definition the inherent logic of ‘containment’: “by preventing the expansion to hasten the downfall of 
that regime.” Halliday, ‘Iran; Partner or Pariah?’, fn.139, p.4; cf. also Clawson, Patrick: ‘The Continuing Logic of Dual 
Containment’, Survival, vol.40, no.1, Spring 1998, pp.33-47, here p.33f. 
198 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, quoted in: Gerges, ‘Washington’s Misguided Iran Policy’, fn.110, p.8. 
199 cf. Neff, Donald: ‘Anti Iran Fever’, Middle East International, 2.2.1997, pp.9-10, here p.9. 
200 cf. Commissioner Karel van Miert, Debates of the European Parliament, no.4-482, p.279: “The pending US sanction 
legislation has already been subject to numerous European demarches (..). In those representations we conveyed our strong-
est objections to the extraterritorial applications of US jurisdiction as a matter of principle (..).” 
201 The notion of Iran as a state refers to the state as a territorial entity, while the notion Iranian state includes the com-
plexity of the internal structure of the state. Cf. Hopgood, Steve: ‘Theories of the State and Foreign Policy’, School of Ori-
ental and African Studies, unpublished paper, 10.1.1997. 
202 For this wording cf. Secretary Warren Christopher: ‘Leadership for the Next American Century’, Address before the 
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, January 18, 1996. 
203 cf. Brzezinski, Zbigniew; Scowcroft, Brent; and Murphy, Richard: ‘Differentiated Containment’, Foreign Affairs, vol.76, 
no.3, May/June 1997, pp.20-30; Murphy, Richard W.: ‘It’s Time to Reconsider the Shunning of Iran, Washington Post, 
20.7.1997, p.C01. 
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threat had been exaggerated204; that keeping military installations in the Gulf to back-
up containment was too expensive205; that isolation brought Iran together with Russia 
and Iraq while in the same time increasing the reliance of the Central Asian states on 
Russia206; and that economic sanctions had in general been ineffective.207 
Instead they argued the U.S.-government should enter into a “productive dialogue” 
with Iran208, stop hindering American firms to pursue their economic interests in the 
region, and continue exerting pressure against Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons.209 
Ironically, some analysts said that U.S.-policy had been based on an exaggerated and 
dangerous ideal to promote democracy, and that the emphasis on human rights should 
be tamed down in favour of focusing on U.S.-interest in Gulf-security.210 
The only critique of American policy that was based on a rather normative approach 
came from Graham Fuller, who strongly argued in favour of a multilateral policy 
with an emphasis on regional security-cooperation, arms control, human rights, and 
in general the end of ‘balance of power’ politics. Such a policy, he stressed, would be 
“more in tune with the realities of the next century.”211 
Hence, while it was often argued that Europeans and Americans should find a 
multilateral approach based on reconciling their policies212, both the supporters of the 
U.S.-approach and most of its critics were far from sharing a common position with 
the EU. The ‘critical dialogue’ differed from ‘active containment’ not only in the 
means applied, but also in the priorities given to the areas of concern about Iranian 
policies. 
European Domestic Opposition 
The main ‘sponsor’ for the EU’s human rights policy, the European Parliament, was 
also the main critic of the ‘critical dialogue’, based on the allegation that the Council 
of Ministers did not do enough to ensure improvements in Iranian behaviour. 
                                                 
204 cf. Gerges, ‘Washington’s Misguided Iran Policy’, fn.110, p.9. 
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stitute Policy Analysis, no.258, Washington, 29.8.1996, p.1. 
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p.52; ‘Symposium on Dual Containment’, fn.3, p.8. 
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Become a More Gentler Place’, The Economist, 18.1.-24.1.1997, p.17-18. 
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Since the fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989, the EP tabled 10 resolutions 
condemning human rights violations in Iran specifically; and three resolutions 
against Iran’s incitement for murder against Rushdie.213 Countless Written Questions 
implicitly criticised the ‘dialogue’, and the parliamentary debates on both questions 
and resolutions continuously held up public awareness on Iranian misconduct.214 
The critique of Iran was strong: Iran was repeatedly condemned for “gross and sys-
tematic violations of human rights”, for the perpetration of “state terrorism” especial-
ly in form of assassinations of opposition figures abroad, for the fatwa against Sal-
man Rushdie, the repression of religious minorities such as the Baha’i community, 
for the “discrimination against women”, for disrespecting the freedoms of religion 
and expression, and in general it was demanded “that the Iranian regime conform[s] 
to international human rights standards.”215 These condemnations were supported by 
a large majority, reflecting a remarkable unity of opposition to the ‘critical dialogue’. 
In May 1989, five month before the EU normalised ties with Iran, the EP called on 
“all Member States and the Community to suspend their relations with the Iranian government 
until it has formally and publicly dissociated itself from the encouragement of international 
terrorism”216 
This shows the discrepancy between the Parliament’s hardline on human rights and 
the EU-Council’s policies in 1990. The ‘critical dialogue’, although reflecting the de-
mands for pressure being exercised against Iran, was never perceived as sufficient. It 
was not surprising, though, that the EP called on the Council “to put a definite end to 
the ‘critical dialogue’” after the Mykonos-trial, and instead to “enhance the dialogue 
with those promoting the transformation of Iran into a democratic state.”217 
As the ‘human rights conscience’ of the EU, the EP’s pressure was powerful. The 
tension between Council and Parliament on policy towards Iran is likely to remain. 
The - expatriate - Iranian Opposition 
The Iranian opposition-in-exile generally rejected the ‘critical dialogue’ and lobbied 
both in European member-states, in the EP, and in the American Congress for tough 
sanctions against Iran.218 Apart from the obvious problems of legitimacy involved in 
discussing this opposition, the fact that the militarily organized Mujahedin e-Khalq, 
the best organized oppositional organisation represented politically by the National 
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217 ‘Resolution on Iran’, 15.5.1997, European Parliament, PE 259.216, Official Journal, No C 167, 2.6.1997. 
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Council of Resistance (NCR), was as radical and undemocratic in its aspirations as 
the Iranian regime, leaves us sceptical in judging the value of their claims.219 
Yet groups like the Foundation for Democracy in Iran who have distanced them-
selves from the NCR have also criticised the EU for its inconsistent policy towards 
Iran and demanded to give higher priority to human rights and impose sanctions.220 
As discussed above, the Danish Parliament in Autumn 1996 agreed to a motion that 
forced the government to open a ‘dialogue’ with Iranian opposition groups. But the 
little support for these groups, their internal divisions, and the absence of a major 
opposition grouping in Iran make such a dialogue very difficult.221 
In absence of an opposition party in Iran the EU decided to support the allegedly 
‘moderates’; however little at times their influence was.222 
VII. The ‘Critical Dialogue’ as a Human Rights Policy 
The analysis and evaluation of the ‘critical dialogue’ has provided a compelling ex-
ample for the increasing importance of normative concerns in the recently developed 
foreign policy of the European Union. The CFSP is deeply entrenched into what has 
become a widely accepted normative consensus on the conduct of international af-
fairs. At the heart of this consensus lies the assertion that moral concerns are an 
inherent part of foreign policy-making in the 1990s. 
Four major conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the ‘critical dialogue’: 
First, the European Union has made human rights one of the core variables in the 
conduct of its foreign policy. However weak and inconsistent the mechanism of the 
CFSP may be, the case study of the ‘critical dialogue’ demonstrates that even in the 
relations with what is perceived as a geopolitically and economically important re-
gion, the EU has not refrained from supporting change in the domestic structure of 
regimes with which it enjoys political and economic ties. This new priority reflects 
the general move towards a concept of foreign policy that reflects what the German 
Foreign Minister calls “a global responsibility” perceived as a duty for all states in 
the “system of international norms” as signatories of the UN Charter.223 
The second conclusion can be drawn directly out of this normative framework: 
namely that in conjunction with the UN Charter the EU argues that coercive measures 
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against a state because of grave human rights violations can only be applied 
multilaterally, since such measures constitute a grave interference into the 
sovereignty of states. As already noted, the European Union has rejected the 
assumption that sovereignty protects a state from being held responsible for domestic 
human rights abuses. Yet if coercion is applied, this coercion must be multilateral to 
be internationally legitimate.224 
Third, the ‘critical dialogue’ was then, in absence of any measures by the United Na-
tions, a multilateral policy based on the idea that cooperation rather than coercion 
can promote change in the internal policies of a state. This policy goes back to the 
CSCE process of the 1970s, where the concept of confidence-building measures was 
applied for the first time to deal with a system that was at that time totally rejecting 
any kind of human rights critique. The CSCE process, too, was shaped by the con-
viction that the internal predicament of a state was salient in determining how policy 
measures should be applied. Thus the CSCE-process defied the ‘balance of power’ 
logic of the Cold War, and though the claim is naturally disputed, surely contributed 
to the changes in the Soviet system and finally the end of the Cold War: 
“Even in the dark days of the Cold War the Helsinki Final Act (like the norms laid down by 
the UN) proved to be of support to the oppressed and those who were struggling to defend the 
cause of human rights. Both official and unofficial contacts between the nations involved have 
contributed to the heartening upturn that followed in 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe.”225 
The last point worth stressing is that the ‘critical dialogue’ put its emphasis on agents 
in Iran that the European Union perceived to hold the key for change. The reliance on 
these ‘moderates’ has been problematic as the Berlin-court has finally proven. Yet in 
absence of a viable alternative it was the only possibility to achieve the long-term 
changes in Iran which were indicated in the above cited Report of the UNSR, and that 
materialised with the election of Muhammed Khatami. 
The ‘critical dialogue’, though, suffered from its inconsistent implementation that has 
continuously undermined its credibility. The major reason for this was that although 
the ‘dialogue’ had been conceptionalised as a multilateral policy, the priorities of the 
‘dialogue’ were interpreted differently in the member-states and thus left the 
European Union as a whole open to charges of ‘double-standards’. France influenced 
an ongoing criminal trial against Iranian suspects, and the decision to let two 
suspected murderers return to Iran for the sake of ‘national interest’ showed that 
‘human rights’ had been at times subordinated to economic interests. Though Iranian 
attempts to break the EU’s unity after the Mykonos-verdict failed, a remark by the 
Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini, “the recalling of the ambassadors was merely 
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a sign of solidarity with Germany as a member state to which we were linked”226, 
demonstrates that mechanical solidarity was not always an expression of shared 
political priorities. 
On the other hand, the European reluctance to use ‘sticks’ or deny ‘carrots’ - apart 
from the overall promise of a cooperation agreement - in reaction to Iranian defiance 
of international norms, brought into question whether improvements in Iranian beha-
viour were really the precondition for rapprochement. Signing lucrative trade-agree-
ments and granting state-secured credits to Iran could have been combined more 
tightly with the demand for improvements in Iranian policies. 
The EU’s integration of human rights into its foreign policy has been 
institutionalized and entrenched to an extent that is - at least for the time being - 
irrevocable. The emphasis on human rights in the Barcelona Declaration on a new 
Mediterranean policy and the formulation in France and Britain of an ‘ethical’ or 
‘moral’ foreign policy further strengthened this trend.227 
Hence the conviction that human rights have a high priority, and that this concern 
must be addressed in dialogue with, not by military or sanctionary pressure against, 
Iran, will remain at the heart of European policy towards Iran. 
In summary, the ‘critical dialogue’ clearly reflected the development of a European 
human rights policy that is based on norms. The policy concept underlying the 
‘dialogue’ was based on a commitment to put human rights first, although the weak-
nesses of the multilateral European foreign policy led to inconsistencies and double-
standards during the process of implementation. 
The election of President Khatami points towards a new Euro-Iranian relationship 
that may have been influenced very little by the ‘critical dialogue’, but confirms the 
trust in support for the Iranian people to bring about change themselves. 
VIII.  Prospects for Future Policies Towards Iran 
Since the suspension of the ‘critical dialogue’ in April 1997 and the presidential elec-
tions in Iran in May 1997 dramatic changes in both Iranian domestic and foreign 
policies occurred. But during the first year of Khatami’s presidency the new regime 
faced fierce opposition from hardliners, the European Union had difficulties to agree 
on a new policy-line, and despite a charm-offensive from both the Iranian and Ame-
rican side, no substantial changes in U.S.-Iranian relations have materialised so far. 
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Khatami’s Election Points Towards Change 
The election of Muhammed Khatami was a clear vote of the Iranian people for a more 
accountable government, the rule of law, and against the harassment and discrimina-
tion of women. A record 21 million Iranians voted for Khatami, among them especi-
ally Youths and women, expressing their dissatisfaction with a stagnating economy 
and the suppression of freedom. On this large bases of popular support, Khatami has 
been given what observers called a “mandate for change”.228 While an analysis of the 
election goes beyond the scope of this paper, the changes affecting Western policies 
towards Iran shall be addressed here. 
To begin with, Khatami’s election re-affirmed the position questioned by the critics 
of engagement with Iran that ‘moderates’ were and are existent in Iran. The struggle 
of the hardliners around the Majlis speaker Ali Nateq Nouri against Khatami, the 
open and controversial public discourse during the election campaign, and the change 
in tone and action after the new cabinet was approved by the Majlis demonstrated 
that the Iranian regime had never been and is not a unified block of power. Khatami 
had been Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance from 1982 to 1992, when he was 
dismissed by the hardliners for being too permissive.229 Hence in retrospect the 
European assertion that the regime consisted of different factions and that some 
factions deserved support rather than isolation was unexpectedly confirmed. 
Yet it would be presumptuous to claim that the ‘critical dialogue’ helped to bring this 
election about.230 The result was not a vote against the fatwa on Salman Rushdie, for 
taming down the obstruction of the Peace Process, or against the international terror-
ist activities the Iranian leadership has now been convicted of. Khatami’s mandate is 
primarily based on the Iranian’s desire for internal reforms, and the ramifications for 
Iran’s foreign policy will depend on improvements in the domestic sphere. 
Accordingly, one of the major Western concerns, the human rights conduct of the 
Iranian regime, is most likely to see improvements in the coming years. In October 
1997 the UN Special Rapporteur Copithorne reported that “promising indicators of 
change” were to be observed in Iran, yet change had been “imperceptible” so far.231 
Namely the appointment of a woman as one of eight Vice-Presidents was interpreted 
as signalling progress on women’s rights, based on the lively public discourse on the 
subject already under way. But apart from these improvements Copithorne observed 
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“backsliding”, notably with the rise of the death penalty, and he saw no progress in 
the situation of the Baha’is and the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.232 
Yet in January 1998 the second report noted that Khatami’s Government “is clearly 
attempting to move towards a more liberal view of dissent and has announced the ob-
jective of developing an Islamic civil society.”233 The government’s policy on wo-
men’s rights pointed to “accelerated change” and the executive branch was “making 
concrete efforts to create a secure context for freedom of expression in Iran.” As first 
steps bans number of publications have been lifted, the number of licenses for 
publications has nearly doubled and a press syndicate was founded.234 Most 
importantly, Copithorne noted that the government, facing increasing opposition 
from the hardliners and groups such as Ansar-e Hezbollah to promote freedom of 
expression, “may now have begun efforts to curb the extrajudicial groups.”235 
A further important step towards political liberalization could be the formal accep-
tance of political parties promised by Khatami during the election.236 Among the first 
factions attempting to register as a party was the moderate technocrats known as 
Kargozaran under the leadership of the popular Tehran Mayor Gholamhussein Kar-
baschi and a previously unknown ‘Islamic Iran Solidarity Party’.237 Political parties 
could be a core institution to foster the growth of civil society in Iran. 
Yet apart from this trend, the situation of the Baha’is remained unchanged, the num-
ber of Executions has continued to grow sharply, and the Spokesman of the Foreign 
Ministry reiterated that the Government did not intend to issue a written guarantee 
that it would not seek to carry out the fatwa against Salman Rushdie.238 
In March Iran hosted a UN workshop on Regional Human Rights Arrangements. The 
High Commissioner on Human Rights Mary Robinson used the occasion to press for 
an invitation of the UNSR to Iran to investigate the human rights situation.239 So far 
Iran has objected the visit since it regards the UNCHR as biased as its resolutions did 
not reflect improvements noted by the UNSR.240 The Rapporteur himself attacked 
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news agencies for their incorrect negative interpretation of his latest report, 
underscoring that the positive trend in Iran continued “and that the executive 
maintained its commitment to establish a more tolerant, more civil rights oriented 
society.241 
As far as foreign policy is concerned, Khatami has so far continued the preceding go-
vernment’s attempts to reconciliation in the region. In December 1997 The Khatami 
government used the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 
Tehran to invigorate this trend. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah attended the summit 
and met twice with Khatami, and Yassir Arafat attended the summit thereby visiting 
Tehran for the first time since 1979. Khatami used a press conference after the 
summit to propose a visit to the United Arab Emirates to discuss the dispute over the 
Abu Musa and Tunbs islands.242  
In respect to the Iranian stance on terrorism, the Khatami government has reiterated 
previous statements by Rafsanjani that Iran objects terrorism in any form.243 Khatami 
has reiterated the Iranian opposition to the Peace Process while stressing that Iran 
does not intend to impose its view on others or stand in their way.244 But he calls Is-
rael “a racist terrorist regime” and regards the support for “peoples who fight for the 
liberation of their land” not as “supporting terrorism” but as “supporting those who 
are engaged in combating state terrorism.”245 Support for Hamas and Hizballah could 
fall under this category, and from that the Iranian position remains ambiguous. 
It has also stressed its commitment not to interfere in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, 
while it regards the Palestinian struggle against the occupation of Lebanon as legiti-
mate. The Majlis ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention246, yet Iranian moves to 
acquire long-range missiles were said to continue. 
The new policies of Khatami’s government are facing growing opposition from the 
hardliners under the guidance of the Spiritual Leader Khamene’i and the Majlis-
Speaker and defeated presidential candidate Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri.247 
Gholamhussein Karbaschi, Tehran Mayor and a core political supporter of President 
Khatami, was imprisoned in April, released after ten days and put on trial for alleged 
corruption.248 Karbaschi is not able to continue his duties as Mayor, and the trial 
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weakens his position and thereby the liberal faction. The chief editor of the daily 
Iran News, Morteza Firuzi, has been sentenced to death on charges of espionage, the 
verdict is under review.249 The Majlis voted to remove Interior Minister Abdollah 
Nouri for creating tensions in society by authorising protest demonstrations and 
giving provocative interviews. Khatami in turn appointed him as Vice-President for 
Development and Social Affairs.250 The four-month-old daily Jamee (Society), a 
symbols for the new freedom of the press under Khatami, was ordered to close down 
by a conservative court, yet the Ministry of Culture so far secured its continued 
publication.251 Similar moves to obstruct the policies of the government are likely to 
continue. Hence the process of political opening in Iran will take a longer time than 
some Western optimists had hoped after the election. But apart from internal opposi-
tion, the regime must promote trust in its foreign policy in the international sphere. 
Khatami’s desire to establish a civil society, to reconstruct the domestic economy, 
and to end Iran’s regional isolation will depend on rapprochement with the West. 
Sustainable economic development will be the precondition for Khatami’s 
government to initiate political reforms252, and economic progress depends on Iran’s 
economic and political cooperation with the West. This was underscored when Iran 
offered 43 oil and gas exploration and development ventures worth $5 bn to Western 
companies in July 1998.253 Western investments in the Iranian oil and gas sector will 
be crucial in determining future economic growth and hence political stability. 
One major challenge lies ahead in the formulation of future Western policy towards 
Iran: Iran is increasingly perceived as the ‘bridge’ to the former Central Asian states 
who’s rich gas and oil-resources are of major economic interest to both European and 
U. S. firms.254 Until now, the United States, however, oppose “any new pipelines 
through Iran carrying oil and gas to Western markets” and threaten to penalise firms 
investing in the Iranian oil market.255 If the U.S. position changes, there is the danger 
of what the American Deputy Secretary of State has called “a new ‘great game’” for 
the exploration of these resources.256 Great game means essentially a geopolitical 
struggle for regional resources and political influence irrespective of the peoples and 
their desires, built on the traditional zones of influence. The alleged American 
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support for the most radical Islamists in Afghanistan (so-called Taleban) to ensure 
stability for a pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan avoiding Iran is such a 
scenario.257 
The exploration of the Central Asian resources is inevitable, but a multilateral body 
to organize and control it would be advantageous before competition turns into 
conflict. Iran is likely to resist anything that could be perceived as an interference 
into its domestic affairs, and radical nationalists could be strengthened if the West 
focused solely on economic interests, keeping in mind the experiences under the 
Shah.258 On the other hand, supporting Islamist groups like the Taleban while 
sanctioning Iran will be perceived as Western ‘double standards’, increasing doubts 
whether Western policy is still guided by hostility towards Iran rather than opposi-
tion to its policies.259 
The EU: From ‘Critical’ to ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ 
As for the European Union, the precondition for the resumption of a ‘dialogue’ - the 
undiscriminatory return of all EU-ambassadors to Teheran - was met in November 
1997.260 Iran declared its relations with the EU “normalised” in December 1997261, 
but restrictions on bilateral Ministerial visits and a ban for Iranian intelligence per-
sonal to enter EU member-states remained in place. Soon after the Iranian election, 
the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel said that Germany “should deal openly 
with the apparently more liberal government”262. After Khatami’s CNN interview he 
argued for “a cautious resumption of contacts” and declared that Germany “wanted to 
resume closer economic cooperation.”263 Under the British presidency the EU re-
viewed its policy towards Iran.264 In February and March the Union finally reacted on 
the new developments in Iran at the European Council in Brussels first by re-estab-
lishing contacts on the ministerial level and in March by declaring to resume a 
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“comprehensive dialogue with Iran”.265 In respect to the areas of concern that charac-
terised the ‘critical dialogue’, namely weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, human 
rights, the fatwa against Salman Rushdie, and Iran’s attitude to the Middle East Peace 
Process, the Council confirmed to continue its critical engagement: 
“While noting some improvements, the Council re-affirmed the importance of fully imple-
menting its existing measures and of its continued vigilance in these areas of concern.”266 
It remains to be seen, however, whether the ‘comprehensive dialogue’ is going to be 
implemented in the same manner as the ‘critical dialogue’. The recent developments 
in Euro-Iranian relations point into a different direction: First, relations have intensi-
fied on a bilateral level, while there has been only one Euro-Iranian meeting yet. And 
second, statements by the Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini demonstrated that 
the consensus on a ‘critical’ policy towards Iran is faltering. 
Dini was the first official to visit Tehran after the Mykonos-verdict just days after the 
EU formally resumed contacts. In a joint press-conference with Iran’s Foreign Minis-
ter Khamal Kharrazi he declared that the ‘critical dialogue’ “proved not to be suc-
cessful” and that the EU had therefore decided to “hold a new form of dialogue”.267 
Kharrazi echoed the statement saying “the time for criticising one another is over” 
thereby re-emphasising his previous critique of the ‘critical’ European approach.268 
Dini’s remarks clearly contradict efforts by the German Foreign Ministry to defend 
the successes of the ‘critical dialogue’269 as well as the EU’s declaration to include 
the areas of concern underlying its previous policy into the ‘comprehensive 
dialogue’. 
The trend was underscored with the visit of the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi 
in Tehran, the most influential European statesman to visit Iran since 1979. 
According to Reuters, his consultations “focused largely on trade-issues” while he 
played down the importance of human rights issues discussed in a meeting with 
President Khatami, saying this was “a problem of just any one country.”270 
In contrast to Italy, the British government - as already noted earlier - has empha-
sised its commitment to demand improvements in the human rights situation in Iran, 
especially concerning the fatwa against Salman Rushdie. Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook underscored that the ‘critical dialogue’ had enabled the EU to address the 
Iran’s human rights record and that he remained opposed to any isolation of Iran.271 
                                                 
265 ‘2070th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Brussels’, 23.2.1998; ‘2078th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Brussels’, 
30/31.3.1998, PRES/98/86; ‘2104th Council Meeting; General Affairs, Luxembourg’, 8/9.6.1998, PRES/98/190. 
266 ‘2070th Council Meeting’, fn.265. 
267 ‘EU’s critical Dialogue Towards Iran Failed’, Iran Weekly Press Digest, vol.11, no.10, p.6. 
268 ibid.; ‘Iran Says ‘Critical Dialogue’ with EU Defunct’, Iran Weekly Press Digest, vol.11, no.6, 31.1.-6.2.1998, p.12. 
269 cf. ‘Kinkel: Die Politik des kritischen Dialogs ist nicht gescheitert’ (Kinkel: The ‘Critical Dialogue’ did not Fail), 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21.4.1997, p.2. 
270 Lyons, Jonathan: U.S. Deeds Must Match Words - Iran’s Khatami’, Reuters, 1.7.1998. 
271 ‘Speech by the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook’, Washington, 19.6.1998 (Internet-document at http.//www.fco.gov.uk). 
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The German government has been very cautious on resuming ties with Iran after the 
Mykonos-verdict. In May 1998 a delegation of the Foreign Ministry hold first talks in 
Tehran to improve bilateral relations.272 On their first meeting 14 months after the 
verdict, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and his counterpart Kamal Kharrazi voiced 
their desire to improve political and economic relations.273 The German-Iranian rap-
prochement is overshadowed by the case of a German national, Helmut Hofer, who 
has been sentenced to death by stoning for an alleged illegitimate sexual relationship 
with an Iranian woman in January. The Iranian Supreme Court is currently reviewing 
the case and the chief of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, said that if the 
court confirmed the sentence, Hofer could be pardoned by the Spiritual Leader Kha-
mene’i.274 Foreign Minister Kinkel has made a solution to the ‘Hofer case’ a precon-
dition for closer ties. In contrast to his Italian colleague Dini, Kinkel has argued that 
the ‘critical dialogue’ had been right in principle, but he wouldn’t use the term any-
more for its negative connotation.275 Accordingly he underscored that the EU’s 
decision to resume dialogue would not qualify the problems of mutual relations with 
Iran: 
“The existing concerns like human rights, Middle East-policy [the Peace Process], non-pro-
liferation, or terrorism, will not be left aside under any circumstances.”276 
In general, those in the European Union convinced that human rights must and will 
remain a priority in Euro-Iranian relations will face increasing pressure from those 
willing to return to ‘business as usual’ with Tehran. Ignoring the concerns underlying 
the ‘critical dialogue’, however, would contradict the basic principles of the Union’s 
foreign policy. Irrespective of the changes in Iran, the European Union must keep a 
consistent stance on acts of violence by ‘radicals’ in Iran who will continue to 
subvert Khatami’s moves towards normalisation in domestic and foreign policies. In 
Germany, the former Minister for Security, Ali Fallahian, is searched per warrant by 
the federal prosecution and the other European member-states have been reassured by 
the Mykonos-verdict that any acts of violence committed or suspected to be 
committed by Iranian agents must be properly prosecuted. The EU must also watch 
closely the human rights situation in Iran, not to blame the Iranian government but to 
support moves towards the liberalization of the system. The European Parliament will 
                                                 
272 The delegation consisted of Peter Dingens, Director general of the Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, and 
Wolf-Ruthardt Born, Director-General for Consular Affairs. cf. ‘German Foreign Ministry Officials Arrive in Tehran’, Iran 
Weekly Press Digest, vol.11, no.20, 9.5.-15-5.1998, p.9. 
273 cf. ‘Bonn und Tehran nähern sich an’ (Bonn and Tehran Reconcile), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12.6.1998, p.6. 
274 cf. ‘The Helmut Hofer Case; Dangerous Liaison of a Hamburger’, Iran Weekly Press Digest, vol.11, no.6, p.5-7. 
275 ‘China liegt nunmal nicht in Afrika’, fn.263. 
276 ‘Interview des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel mit der Saarbrücker Zeitung’ (Interview with Foreign 
Minister Klaus Kinkel), 27.2.1998. (Translation M.S.); This was e.g. indicated by the German Government’s Report on 
Human Rights stating that “the human rights situation in Iran remains poor”, demonstrating the determination to monitor the 
situation critically. ‘Iranian Human Rights Situation Still Poor - Bonn’, Reuters, 4.12.1997. 
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remain critical to any ‘normalisation’ of ties without clear signals of change in 
Iran277. 
The European Union shares many interests with Iran: to integrate Iran in a system of 
regional security, to help overcoming the internal economic crises, and to strengthen 
political ties with a ‘moderate’ Iran. But normalisation will be conditional on Iran’s 
human rights record, on taming resistance towards the Peace Process, on an end to 
internationally pursued violence, and on a consensual solution to the Rushdie fatwa. 
The United States: Towards Historical Reconciliation? 
As for the United States, the State Department indicated soon after Khatami’s elec-
tion its desire to open a ‘dialogue’ with Iran, bound to the condition that Iran 
“is willing to discuss areas of concern (..), ‘namely its opposition to the Middle East peace 
process, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and its support for international terrorism’.”278 
This public proposal was accompanied by a secret overture for “direct, face-to-face 
talks to the government of Iran” delivered by the Swiss Ambassador in Iran to the 
Iranian Foreign Ministry.279 Iran rejected the (public) proposal demanding that the 
U.S. should “drop its terrorism charges (..) to prove it wants to end its hostility to-
wards the Islamic Republic”.280 The Spiritual Leader Khamene’i who is in control of 
foreign policy, refused categorically “the possibility of improved relations with 
Iran”.281 
Yet in an extraordinary interview on Cable News Network (CNN) in January 1998, 
President Khatami called for a “crack in the wall of mistrust” between the United 
States and Iran and proposed a dialogue with the American people.282 The U.S.-re-
sponse remained cautious283 until President Clinton answered officially at the end of 
January 1998, giving way to speculations that mistrust could indeed be overcome: 
“We have real differences with some Iranian policies, but I believe these are not insurmount-
able (..). I hope that we have more exchanges between our people and that the day will soon 
come when we can enjoy once again good relations with Iran.”284 
In June 1998 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a speech to the Asia Society, 
sketched “a road map leading to normal relations” echoing President Khatami’s 
“desire for ‘a world in which misunderstandings can be overcome and mutual respect 
and logic govern relations among states.’”285 Albright’s speech was significant for 
                                                 
277 cf. its latest move urging both Council of Ministers and member-states to consider measures to increase pressure on Ira-
nian authorities: ‘Resolution on Human Rights’, 19.2.1998, European Parliament, Official Journal, No C 80, 16.3.1998. 
278 Spokesman James Rubin, quoted in: ‘U.S. Cautiously Welcomes Iran Cabinet Approval’, Reuters, 21.8.1997. 
279 Gellman, Barton: ‘U.S. Proposed Direct Talks in Overture to Iran’, Washington Post, 9.1.1998, p.A01. 
280 IRNA report quoted in: ‘Iran Says U.S. should Drop Charges of Terrorism’, Reuters, 21.8.1997. 
281 ‘U.S. Should Drop Charges’, fn.280. 
282 cf. ‘CNN-Interview with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami’, fn.10. 
283 cf. Shalal-Esa, Andrea: ‘U.S. welcomes Khatami Remarks but Wanted More’, Reuters, 7.1.1998. State Department 
spokesman James Rubin reiterated that “the way to address the issues (..) is for our two governments to talk directly.” 
284 ‘Clinton Backs More Contact with Iranians’, Washington Post, 30.1.1998, p.A28. 
285 ‘Secretary of State Madeleine Albright; Remarks at 1998 Asia Society Dinner, New York’, 17.6.1998. 
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three reasons: first, she dedicated large parts to the internal developments 
surrounding the election of President Khatami, turning away from the ‘rogue state’ 
rhetoric to a differentiated analyses of the domestic Iranian predicament. Second, and 
following from this, she named “serious violations of human rights” in Iran as the 
second major area of concern to the U.S. government besides the charges of “support 
for terrorism”, and “efforts to develop long-range missiles and to acquire nuclear 
weapons”. Previous charges that Iran undermined the Peace Process by supporting 
Hizballah and Hamas were substituted by welcoming Iran’s decision to acquiesce on 
potential Arab-Israeli agreements. Third, Albright suggested that Iran could be in-
cluded in “multilateral efforts to protect international security”, as an example she 
mentioned the multilateral effort to counter the threat to peace in the Gulf War 
against Iraq in 1991. This could be interpreted as a sign that after the lost opportunity 
in 1991/92 the U.S. want to integrate Iran into a collective security system in the 
Gulf now, based especially on the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 
recent months. 
As first steps to ease American-Iranian mistrust Albright said that access to visas for 
Iran had been facilitated, travel warnings for Iran revised286, cultural and academic 
exchanges were supported, and the State Department was exploring “further ways to 
build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings.” President Clinton demonstra-
ted his consent with Albright one day later emphasising that the United States were 
seeking a “genuine reconciliation with Iran based on mutuality and reciprocity 
(..).”287 
The American recognition of the new situation in Iran had already been reflected first 
in July 1997 with the US decision not to oppose the building of a pipeline that will 
carry oil from Turkmenistan through Iran to Turkey. Even though at the time 
Albright declared that the decision did not signal any change in US policy on Iran, it 
was interpreted as a major step towards reconciliation288. 
Second, the administration granted a waiver to Total, Gazprom, and Petronas for the 
investment in the South Pars gas-field in May 1998.289 The waiver had been the result 
of intense Euro-American bargaining on the ILSA. In an ‘understanding’ between the 
EU and the U.S. in April 1997 the EU had agreed to suspend its panel against the 
ILSA at the World Trade Organisation in exchange for the American commitment to 
work for granting the EU Member States with a waiver under Section 9(c) or 4(c) of 
                                                 
286 cf. ‘U.S. Eases Warning on Travel to Iran’, Iran Weekly Press Digest, vol.11, no.13/14, 19.3.-3.4.1998, p.9. 
287 ‘Remarks by the President’, fn.11. 
288 cf. Morgan, Dan; Ottaway, David B.: ‘U.S. Won’t Bar Pipeline Across Iran; Move Seen as Gesture Of Reconciliation, 
Easing of Isolation’, Washington Post, 27.7.1997, p.A01. 
289 ‘Iran and Libya Sanctions Act’, fn.255; ‘EU-US Summit Reaches Deal on Sanctions’, 18.5.1998, EU Press Release, PR 
43/98. 
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the ILSA.290 During the U.S.-EU Summit in May 1998 Albright waived the 
imposition of sanctions against the three firms arguing that the sanctions were not in 
American interest. Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat defended the decision 
saying 
“a decision to sanction would have undermined our efforts at multilateral and bilateral coop-
eration and would not have stopped the South Pars deal.”291 
In respect to the aims of the ILSA, non-proliferation and counterterrorism, the U.S. 
had achieved “a very high level of cooperation with [its] European partners” Albright 
argued, and these joint efforts could have been undermined by the sanctions. And if 
the high level of cooperation could be maintained, future ILSA cases similar to South 
Pars “would result in like decisions with regard to waivers for EU companies.”292 
Finally, the President vetoed the ‘Iran-Russia Sanctions Bill’ intending to impose 
sanctions against any country assisting Iran in acquiring technology to construct 
long-range missiles.293 The administration argued the bill could obstruct the good 
U.S.-cooperation with Russia to prevent sales of missile and nuclear technology to 
Iran.294 
But serious impediments to U.S.-Iranian reconciliation remain. In March 1998 Presi-
dent Clinton declared that the national emergency with respect to Iran had to 
continue 
“because the actions and policies of the Government of Iran continue to threaten the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States”.295 
With the national emergency the sanctions imposed in 1995 will remain, and a strong 
lobby is opposed to lifting them.296 Accordingly, American companies were sidelined 
when Iran offered the above mentioned oil and gas projects.297 As Gary Sick notes, 
the sanction acts as well as other structures and regulations will continue to “serve as 
legal impediments and irritants in relations among the US, Iran and key allies.”298 An 
end of the Republican majority in Congress after the elections in 1998 could be a cru-
cial factor in revising the American position. 
                                                 
290 ‘Understanding between the European Union and the United States on US Extraterritorial Legislation’, 11.4.1997 
(Internet-document at http://europa.eu.int). The ILSA grants waivers under section 4(c) for states implementing measures to 
achieve the aims of the act, namely to prevent Iran from supporting terrorism and acquiring weapons of mass destruction, 
and under section 9(c) if it is important to the national interest. 
291 Eisenstat, Stuart E.: ‘Economic sanctions’, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington 
DC, 3.6.1998. 
292 ‘ILSA; Decision in the South Pars Case’, fn.255. For a sharp critique of the decision cf. the Director of the Foundation of 
Democracy in Iran: Timmermann, Kenneth R.: ‘No Time to Play Nice with Iran’, Washington Times, 22.6.1998. 
293 ‘Clinton blockiert Iran-Gesetz’ (Clinton Vetoes Iran-Act), Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25.6.1998, p.10. 
294 But high approval of the bill in both Senate (90 to 4) and House (392 to 22) indicates a majority overriding the veto. Cf. 
Dewar, Helen: ‘House Joins Senate in Passing Bill on Russia-Iran Sanctions’, Washington Post, 10.6.1998, p.A09. 
295 ‘Continuation of Iran Emergency’, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 4.3.1998. 
296 Inter alia the architect of ‘dual containment’ Martin Indyk and the National Security Council’s Middle East expert Bruce 
Riedel. Cf. Fischer, Dean, MacLeod, Scott: ‘New Day Coming?’, Time, 19.1.1998, pp.28-30, here p.29f. 
297 ‘U.S. Oilmen Look but can’t Touch as Iran Opens Up’, Reuters, 1.7.1998. 
298 Sick, ‘Rethinking Dual Containment’, fn.112, p.23. 
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A Common Euro-American Approach? 
From its very beginning the British EU presidency made Euro-Iranian relations a 
“policy priority”. The British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook declared to use all his 
influence to find a common Euro-American approach on Iran.299 As already noted, the 
major difficulties lay in overcoming differences on U.S.-extraterritorial legislation 
and on the means and priorities of influencing change in Iranian policies. 
In respect to both questions, the British presidency achieved major improvements to-
wards reconciling EU and U.S. policies. With granting a waiver to the South Pars 
project and promising like decisions in similar cases, the ILSA has been basically 
outmanoeuvred. The United States have acknowledged that the secondary boycott 
legislation undermines transatlantic cooperation and is detrimental to American 
interests. 
But the U.S. government has in turn pressured the EU successfully to find a common 
line on counterterrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the 
two major U.S.-concerns in respect to Iran. At the U.S.-EU Summit in London in 
May 1998 two declarations were issued to underscore future cooperation on these is-
sues: 
- a Declaration on Common Orientation of Non-Proliferation Policy300 in which the 
EU and U.S. emphasised their “common interest in non-proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction” and promised to enhance cooperation to ensure adherence to inter-
national control regimes. The EU declared its readiness to include such concerns in 
contacts with countries in the Middle East and South Asia, “notably Iran.” Pressure 
on Russia will be reinforced against its assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile pro-
gramme. In particular, intense cooperation was proposed on dual-use goods and tech-
nology exports, an area of special U.S. concern in respect to Iran. The EU empha-
sised its comprehensive Dual-Use Regime already prevented exports of sensitive 
technology. 
- a Statement of Shared Objectives and Close Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism301, 
in which improvements in cooperation and joint action against terrorism on the bases 
of international legal instruments were proposed. The statement did not refer specifi-
cally to Iran but Secretary of State Albright emphasised that the “high level of coop-
eration with our European partners” on counterterrorism inter alia concerning Iran 
influenced the waiver granted in the South-Pars case, and that she expected in turn 
the cooperation to be strengthened by that decision.302 
                                                 
299 Ljunggren, David: ‘UK to press U.S. Hard on Iran over the Next Six Months’, Reuters, 14.1.1998. 
300 ‘EU/US Declaration on Common Orientation of Non-Proliferation Policy’, London, 18.5.1998. 
301 ‘Statement of EU/US Shared Objectives and Close Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism’, London, 18.5.1998. 
302 ‘ILSA; Decision in the South Pars Case’, fn.255. 
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Both declarations are significant especially for the American acknowledgement that 
European policy towards Iran did in fact meet U.S.-concerns much better than the 
preceding transatlantic rows had indicated. From that the ‘critical dialogue’ in retro-
spect earned approval by the U.S. government in some key areas, an important mes-
sage to those arguing that the EU had been weak on terrorism and proliferation. 
With the ILSA-waiver and the two declarations the Summit managed to bridge the 
transatlantic rift on policy towards Iran in the main areas of dispute. And with the re-
cent shift in U.S.-policy to take into account the domestic developments in Iran, no-
tably human rights, Euro-American differences on Iran have diminished further. But 
as long as American unilateral sanctions against Iran remain, there will be no com-
mon policy towards Iran. The ground has been laid, however, and it seems to be only 
a matter of time until the means applied to influence Iranian policies will converge. 
IX. Conclusion 
The analyses of the ‘critical dialogue’ has provided a deep insight into the problems 
of a common European human rights policy towards Iran. Above all, the European 
Union has shown a clear commitment to address its concerns about human rights 
abuses, terrorism, and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process in dialogue with the Iranian 
government. This commitment derived from the increasing structural importance of 
human rights in the CFSP. Hence the future of Euro-Iranian relations will inevitably 
involve disputes over human rights questions as long as the situation in Iran gives 
reason for concern. 
But the ‘critical dialogue’ had major weaknesses: It lacked clear limits, restrictive 
actions remained limited to unilateral severing of ties; consensus among European 
member-states was weak, leading to inconsistencies especially in the handling of 
assassinations on European soil; and the EU was incapable of publicly presenting the 
policy in a way that would have insured an understanding for its objectives and 
successes. In effect the ‘critical dialogue’ became the catchword for a moral fig-leaf 
to cover lucrative commercial relations with the Mullah-regime in Tehran. 
This paper clearly demonstrated that the ‘critical dialogue’ was, despite its weaknes-
ses, a consistent European policy to influence both Iranian domestic and foreign poli-
cies. With the American policy of ‘active containment’ focusing mainly on alleged 
Iranian terrorist activities, its quest for weapons of mass destruction and its oppositi-
on to the Peace Process, the ‘critical dialogue’ was in fact the first comprehensive 
Western human rights policy towards Iran since the Iranian Revolution. 
With the verdict in the Mykonos-trial and the following suspension of the ‘critical 
dialogue’, the European consensus and commitment to critical engagement was bro-
ken. It remains to be seen whether the newly declared ‘comprehensive dialogue’ will 
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follow its predecessor, i.e. whether European policy-makers will resist the temptation 
of reducing Euro-Iranian relations to bilateral economic cooperation. 
If that were the case, the sharp and superficial critics of the ‘critical dialogue’ could 
have gained a Pyrrhic victory: in discrediting the ‘critical dialogue’ they have sup-
ported those arguing that a ‘realistic’ foreign policy should not involve human rights 
concerns. In retrospect, they should have engaged in criticising the inconsistencies of 
that approach and demand more tangible action rather than rejecting the policy as a 
whole. 
The appeal of two Iranian authors, Abbas Maroufi and Faraj Sarkuhi, to resume a 
‘critical dialogue’ with Iran, has been a late but important acknowledgement for the 
European critical engagement with Iran.303 Both writers have been subject to perse-
cution in Iran, both live in exile, and both voiced the desire to return to an open Iran 
with a functioning civil society. Once ‘business as usual’ reigns Western-Iranian 
relations, there will be little space left in ministerial contacts to address serious 
violations of human rights, the fate of imprisoned or disappeared writers, the 
situation of the Baha’is, and the threats to the life of Salman Rushdie. If Western 
governments have been serious in their desire to influence Iranian politics, they 
should continue their efforts, even if tangible results will always be difficult to 
obtain. 
In general, the core condition for change in Iran remains the willingness and ability 
of Khatami’s government to deliver the improvements promised in the election. 
Change in Iran is essentially an internal development, external influence can only be 
exercised by conditioning rapprochement to change in Iranian policies, since domes-
tic development is dependent on foreign investment and trade. Tangible results will 
be difficult to obtain, but a long-term strategy could trigger political liberalization, 
promoting in turn the re-integration of Iran into the international community. This 
process needs to be viewed critically to finally improve the living conditions of the 
Iranian people. 
                                                 
303 ‘Eine echte Chance; Wandel im Iran: Der Schriftsteller Abbas Maroufi befürwortet die Wiederaufnahme des kritischen 
Dialoges mit dem Mullah-Regime, nur sollte er diesmal wirklich kritisch sein’ (A Real Chance; The Writer Maroufi supports 
to Resume Dialogue with the Mullahs), Die Woche, 5.9.1997, p.28; ‘Wer denkt, wird zwangsläufig politisch’fn.134. 
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* Appendix 
TABLE 2: WESTERN EXPORTS TO IRAN 1991-1997 IN MILLION US$304 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
EU-Total 10.201.810 10.923.254 7.081.287 4.671.988 4.318.061 4.897.000 5.522.000
Austria 376.034 384.060 300.135 240.075 133.822 n. a. n. a.
Benelux 400.634 378.891 298.776 263.297 251.751 280.200 307.100
Denmark 190.610 169.708 169.884 81.582 83.562 n. a. n. a.
Finland 118.069 93.871 60.516 93.248 59.834 n. a. n. a.
France 894.227 744.610 765.659 818.043 566.061 672.200 738.200
Germany 4.006.720 5.030.473 2.448.711 1.556.137 1.617.082 1.477.800 1.721.800
Greece 19.382 24.879 14.297 9.109 4.946 n. a. n. a.
Ireland 15.927 20.344 29.806 53.238 58.944 n. a. n. a.
Italy 1.757.001 2.052.458 1.376.067 721.398 518.420 714.000 848.000
Netherlands 455.334 429.917 311.955 206.910 245.047 235.500 275.714
Portugal 12.264 23.014 8.706 5.748 20.938 n.a. n.a.
Spain 371.991 278.489 389.741 128.679 162.651 265.580 328.980
Sweden 722.704 324.109 181.061 63.986 79.954 131.130 184.970
United Kingdom 860.913 968.431 725.971 430.538 515.048 620.700 648.400
Japan 2473.487 2664.923 1465.330 934.152 661.065 713.200 738.200
United States305 522.375 744.460 613.202 325.873 274.500 300 1.100
TABLE 3: WESTERN IMPORTS FROM IRAN 1991-1997 IN MILLION US$ 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
EU-Total 8.588.823 7.765.602 7.194.806 5.955.548 6.919.588 7.617.000 5.823.000
Austria 164.391 123.112 84.398 84.139 47.074 n. a. n. a.
Benelux 1.101.974 1.036.612 35.111 74.322 65.516 95.800 49.500
Denmark 18.234 18.163 25.903 14.788 17.684 n. a. n. a.
Finland 24.904 30.415 1.801 4.238 1.476 n. a. n. a.
France 1.340.433 1.089.734 1.501.061 1.034.063 1.374.500 1.274.300 925.800
Germany 890.733 707.276 781.489 816.627 811.206 723.300 685.200
Greece 625.507 699.037 764.081 509.927 467.988 n. a. n. a.
Ireland 244 1.165 1.486 1.296 1.938 n. a. n. a.
Italy 1.634.335 1.648.477 1.468.991 1.022.434 1.753.264 1.924.400 1.790.000
Netherlands 1.173.375 1.404.033 1.329.298 991.206 750.405 738.477 644.698
Portugal 204.479 134.044 70.184 362.320 342.568 n.a. n.a.
Spain 717.384 356.773 573.017 633.843 784.831 964.610 733.980
Sweden 411.877 229.926 207.531 192.731 265.599 202.190 229.600
United Kingdom 280.953 285.835 350.454 213.613 235.543 183.100 59.600
Japan 2.781.424 2.610.390 2.449440 2.772.834 2.824.072 3.255.600 3.523.900
                                                 
304 Data for 1991-95: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (ed.): Foreign trade by Commodities, 
vol.1-5, 1995, OECD, 1998; Data for 1996-97: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (ed.): Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade, January 1996-May 1998; Data on EU-Total 1996-97: Eurostat, fn.164; Data for Netherlands 
1997: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (ed.): Maandstatistiek van de internationale handel, vol.2, December 1997, Voor-
burg, Heerlen, 1997, p.15; Data for Italy 1997 according to Italian Ministry of Economics, quoted in: Lyons, U.S. Deeds 
Must Match Words’, fn.270; Austria, Finland, and Sweden count for EU-total only since joining the EU on 1 January 1995; 
n.a. means data not available for these countries for 1996-1997. 
305 Both American exports and imports were said to be higher than officially stated since they are handled in Dubai and do 
not appear in official statistics. In general U.S.-exports were estimated at $1 bn for 1992, $1,4 bn for 1993, and $4,3 bn in 
1994, while U.S.-imports were estimated at $3,5 bn in 1992 and 1993, cf. fn.182. 
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